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I. INTRODUCTION
Research undertaken in areas of humanities relies on interpretation of
texts that must be understood, interpreted, and recombined in a manner
which adds something new to existing knowledge. This process is
“hermeneutics.” The word hermeneutics comes from Greek hermeneuein,
meaning to interpret, and the noun hermeneia, meaning interpretation;1
hermeneia, in turn, gets its origin from the Greek god Hermes, who was an
interpreter, a messenger, a liar, and a schemer.2
Hermeneutics, as a methodology, is different from empirical research. In
empirical research, imaginary dialogue, there both the procedure and the
results are independently observable and can be repeated by others; while in
hermeneutics, the entire process of understanding texts occurs within the
mind of the researcher and this process is not directly replicable. This
distinction, between methods of the mind and empirical research, tempts
1. Muhammad Bilal Farooq, A Review of Gadamerian and Ricoeurian Hermeneutics and Its Application
to Interpretive Accounting Research, 13 QUALITATIVE RSCH. ORGS. & MGMT. 261, 262 (2018).
2. Anshuman Prasad, The Contest Over Meaning: Hermeneutics as an Interpretive Methodology for
Understanding Texts, 5 ORGANIZATIONAL RSCH. METHODS 12, 29–30 (2002).
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the researcher not to explain the methodology of textual analysis and leave
the issue of method to a general concept of “standard legal scholarship” or
other similarly amorphous terms.3 These “amorphous terms,” with some
notable exceptions from legal scholars advocating the use of hermeneutics,4
usually relate to certain canons of construction and methods of
interpretation that are difficult to explain. This is because approaching a
text with a toolbox of specific techniques is contrary to the goal of
understanding the wide breadth of cultural and historical experiences
imbedded in the text.5 In the discussion below, I demonstrate the issues
relating to hermeneutic research and the role of hermeneutics in justifying
the validity of knowledge obtained from textual interpretation.6
In order to explain the issues involved in textual analysis, I will follow the
key debates among F.D.E. Schleiermacher,7 Emilio Betti,8 and Hans-Georg
Gadamer.9 The hermeneutic approach described by Gadamer integrates
many of the ideas of Hegel, in particular the concept of “Geist” (spirit) and
the Geist’s central role in enabling understanding of texts across different
time periods and cultures.10 Consequently, substantial discussion of

3. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1835
(1988) (“[Standard legal scholarship] seems to lack a unified purpose, a coherent methodology, a sense
of forward motion, and a secure link to its past traditions. It is bedeviled by a gnawing sense that it
should adopt the methods of other disciplines but it is uncertain how the process is to be accomplished.
The field even lacks a conceptual framework within which to criticize itself.”).
4. See generally, John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986) (discussing
hermeneutics in normative legal decisions); David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and
Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 136 (1985) (discussing hermeneutics, critical theory,
and poststructuralism).
5. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 1877–78 (drawing upon “the totality of our historical and cultural
experience” when using hermeneutics instead of more text-bound literary tools).
6. See generally Konstantin Vertsman, Gadamerian Hermeneutics in Practice as a Paradigm for Legal
Interpretation and Analysis, 54 ST. MARY’S L.J. (2023) (highlighting contrasting judicial approaches and
explaining their influence of prejudices in juridical analysis).
7. See generally F.D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTICS: THE HANDWRITTEN
MANUSCRIPTS (Heinz Kimmerle ed., James Duke & Jack Forstman trans., Scholars Press for the Am.
Acad. of Religion 1977) (analyzing the meaning of understanding).
8. See generally EMILIO BETTI, HERMENEUTICS AS A GENERAL METHODOLOGY OF THE
SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT (Mariano Croce & Marco Goldoni eds., Routledge 2021) (1962)
(characterizing Betti’s interest as “theoretical, not practical”).
9. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall trans., Continuum 2d rev. ed. 2004) (1975) (defining “Bildung as ‘the properly human way
of developing one’s natural talents and capacities’” and questioning “its association with the aesthetic
taken as an ideal of life[]”).
10. Id. at 11.
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G.W.F. Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit11 is necessary to gain an
understanding of the concepts and references within Gadamer’s Truth and
Method and other works mentioned above.
Overall, the more compelling perspective in these debates is that of
Gadamer, who can be regarded as the central figure in hermeneutics.12
Gadamer sees hermeneutics more as a phenomenological description of
how texts are interpreted, rather than as a specific method for textual
analysis. Application of aphorisms or canons of construction cannot be
executed suitably or justified logically when undertaking an analysis and
interpretation of textual material, which has been created over the course of
more than 100 years and involves authors from a variety of cultures.
Consequently, Gadamer’s perspective shows the tension, or perhaps
contradiction, between the idea of truth and the idea of method within the
humanities.13 As Gadamer explains, hermeneutics comes as a precursor to
the logic of scientific discovery, particularly in the moral sciences, or
Geisteswissenschaften,14 where the object of discovery necessarily becomes
the researcher himself.15 In 1883, Wilhelm Dilthey referenced the term
Geisteswissenschaften as “sciences of spirit,” or sciences of the human
mind, specializing in understanding and claiming objectivity in essentially a
different manner from the cause-and-effect approach of the natural
sciences.16
Unfortunately, much of the literature on hermeneutics was originally
written in German,17 which creates a limitation on our understanding
because “[m]astering the language is a necessary precondition for coming to
an understanding in a conversation.”18 A translation is in itself an
interpretation rather than simply a reproduction; consequently, “to depend
11. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 6 (Michael Inwood trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 2018) (“Culture and the emergence from the immediacy of substantial life will always have
to begin . . . . with universal principals and points of view . . . .”).
12. Stick, supra note 4, at 334 n.7.
13. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 559 (“In my work, heightening the tension between truth
and method had a polemical intent.”).
14. Emilio Betti interprets Geisteswissenschaften as “sciences of the spirit” in the title of the book,
Hermeneutics as a General Methodology of the Sciences of the Spirit. See generally BETTI, supra note 8, at xi
(explaining the translation of Betti’s title).
15. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 556 (discussing a metaphysical connection between scientific
research and the one conducting that research).
16. AUSTIN HARRINGTON, HERMENEUTIC DIALOGUE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: A CRITIQUE
OF GADAMER AND HABERMAS 8 (2001).
17. Id.
18. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 387.
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on an interpreter’s translation is an extreme case that doubles the
hermeneutical process . . . .”19 Nonetheless, this doubled hermeneutic
process is frequently necessary; fully understanding a language is not simply
understanding how to speak it, but also living it to bypass an interpretive
process.20 Beyond the limitation inherent in translation, there is also an
issue of the meaning of words, which shifts among authors, among writings
by the same author, and within the same language over the course of time.21
In further laying out the hermeneutic approach discussed in this Article,
this section is structured in a manner that imitates the hermeneutic
methodology followed by a reader. First, there is a brief introduction of
contemporary hermeneutics, which serves to provide some level of preunderstanding. This general discussion is then followed by a more detailed
discussion and contextualization of the issues within hermeneutics in a
manner analogous to an editor’s note, foreword, and afterword. This type
of approach predisposes a reader’s further understanding of the
hermeneutical methodology followed in this Article. As further explained,
initial pre-understandings necessary to engage this writing must come from
within the interpreter based on the shared human nature between the text
and the interpreter.
II. CONTEMPORARY USE OF HERMENEUTICS IN SCHOLARLY RESEARCH
Hermeneutics may be separated into romantic, philosophical, and critical
hermeneutics.22 Romantic hermeneutics provide a general theory for
understanding difficult texts involving both objective and subjective
elements to understand the author’s original intended meanings.23
Philosophical hermeneutics looks to interpretation of texts from the
perspectives of the author and the independent subjectivity of the reader

19. Id.
20. See id. at 387–88 (describing a translator’s dual role of preserving language and attempting
to emphasize an author’s non-textual cues).
21. For example, translating the concept of Bildung is difficult because the term has several
meanings: formation, culture, education. See JEAN GRONDIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF GADAMER 24
(Kathryn Plant trans., Routledge 2014) (1999) (providing an explanation of how bildung has been used
since the time of Goethe and the evolving meaning of this term).
22. See, e.g., Prasad, supra note 2, at 14 (classifying hermeneutics into three categories “for
analytical convenience”).
23. See Farooq, supra note 1, at 264 (emphasizing language as the portal for understanding and
knowledge between humans).
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given the cultural environment surrounding the interpreter.24 Philosophical
hermeneutics rejects the separation between the text and the reader, as well
as the pursuit of the author’s intended meaning.25 Instead, philosophical
hermeneutics emphasizes the role of traditions and prejudices in
interpretation, the dialogue between the text and the interpreter, and that
interpretation does not need to conform to the intention of the author.26
Critical hermeneutics builds upon philosophical hermeneutics to include “a
critique of the ideological aspects of the text being interpreted.”27
Although these three categories are separated in contemporary academic
articles on hermeneutics, the distinction between critical hermeneutics and
philosophical hermeneutics is not substantial.
Specifically, critical
hermeneutics may be attributed to Habermas with a focus on the
interpreter’s critique of ideological aspects of texts, while the philosophical
hermeneutics of Gadamer requires engagement with the text and preserves
a collaborative role between the interpreter and the text.28 To the extent
critical hermeneutics identifies an objective meaning that requires criticism,
it would behave as romantic hermeneutics albeit with social commentary.
To the extent the understandings of the interpreter are included in the
interpretation along with the understandings of the author, the critical
hermeneutic approach would not be different from the philosophical
hermeneutics of Gadamer.
III. KEY ISSUES IN HERMENEUTICS
One of the major difficulties in hermeneutics relates to the concept of the
hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic circle relates to the reality that text is
understood from its parts, while the parts are understood in terms of the
whole text. The problem arises in how to approach this circle; to read the
whole one must understand the parts, and to understand the parts one must

24. See Prasad, supra note 2, at 15 (characterizing philosophical hermeneutics as a focus on
philosophies of interpretation).
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. (describing the intensity of the Gadamer-Habermas debate); see also Farooq, supra
note 1, at 265, 269 (“Philosophers following the approach of critical hermeneutics include Habermas
and Ricoeur (Byrne, 2001). Habermas (1990) believed that it was necessary for interpreters to adopt a
critical perspective (a critique of ideology) when interpreting a text; a perspective which Ricoeur (1991)
argues was missing from Gadamerian hermeneutics.”).
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read the whole.29 Also, how does one get out of this circle and reach
understanding?30 The resolution to this issue comes in different forms
from different schools of thought in hermeneutics. For Schleiermacher, to
resolve this problem:
One must begin by ascertaining the usage of the given word from the context
of the sentence in which it occurs. Then, by comparing all known applications
of the word, one can determine the general sphere in a provisional way. This
provisional grasp of the general meaning becomes the point of departure for
the hermeneutical operations specifically directed toward determining the
special application in each particular case.31

Rather than looking for another method to initially enter the hermeneutic
circle to begin to ascertain the initial “context” or “word”, Schleiermacher
substitutes completeness with feeling.32 On the other hand, Gadamer has
the interpreter engage in a dialogue examining the text until there is an
agreement and a “fusion of the horizons” between the text and the
interpreter, resolving the hermeneutic circle.33 Finally, Ricoeur, in his
critical hermeneutics, attempts to build onto the ideas of Gadamer, while
also providing a more methodical approach to this dialogue by separating
the reading into three stages: surface or naïve interpretation; structural
analysis; and depth interpretation with “critical reflexivity to remove
unproductive” prejudices.34 However, Ricoeur’s methodological approach
is difficult to execute. Ricoeur presumes interpreters have control over their
prejudices, and fails to resolve the logical issue of entering into the
hermeneutic circle because even a naïve understanding would be impossible
without some pre-existing background.
A second major issue in hermeneutics relates to the role of intuitive
reasoning or common sense. Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Gadamer approached
the issue of common sense with differing skepticism. In explaining the
nature of hermeneutics in his Compendium of 1819, Schleiermacher wrote: “It
is commonly believed that by following general principles one can trust
29. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 189 (noting Schleiermacher’s approach of following
Frederick Ast in approaching the hermeneutic circle as logically circular).
30. See id. (noting Schleiermacher’s approach of following Frederick Ast in approaching the
hermeneutic circle as logically circular).
31. SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 32.
32. Id. at 77.
33. Farooq, supra note 1, at 266–67.
34. Id. at 270–72, 276.
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one’s common sense. But if that is so, by following special principles, one
can trust one’s natural instincts.”35 Presumably, Schleiermacher held natural
instincts above common sense, but neither concept is sufficiently explained
within Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics manuscripts to understand his
positions on these concepts. For Hegel, common sense was an appeal to
feeling or internal oracle, which effectively prevented meaningful discussion
or pursuit of agreement between people engaging in a dialogue.36 Likewise,
Gadamer defined feeling to be very similar in nature to common sense.
Namely, Gadamer defined feeling as “an immediate, sympathetic, and
[congenial] understanding.”37 With Gadamer relying predominantly on
Hegel’s philosophy, Gadamer did not find appeals to feeling or common sense
necessary for his theory of hermeneutics. Overall, only Schleiermacher
found intuitive reasoning acceptable, albeit in limited circumstances. By
contrast, Gadamer and Hegel both rejected explicit reliance on intuition,
with Hegel treating intuitive reasoning as nothing more than pernicious
indolence.
Another unavoidable issue in discussing hermeneutics is the concept of
Geist, which is frequently translated as “spirit.” The development of the
concept of Geist occurred throughout Hegel’s writings in the early 19th
century. Hegel “distinguishes three stages of [Geist]: ‘subjective spirit’
(roughly, the individual mind), ‘objective spirit’ (the collective social life of
a people), and ‘absolute spirit’ (art, religion, and philosophy).”38 In The
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel refers to the individual mind as the “soul,”39
leaving the Geist more oriented towards the objective and absolute spirit.
Spirit, then, is consciousness in general, which comprehends within itself sensory
certainty, perception, and the understanding, insofar as in its self-analysis spirit
holds fast to the moment of being an objective actuality to itself, and abstracts
from the fact that this actuality is its own Being-for-itself. . . . Spirit is the
ethical life of a people insofar as spirit is the immediate truth; the individual that
is a world.40

The Geist, according to Hegel, is the essence of the commonwealth:
35. SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 96.
36. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 32.
37. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 190.
38. Michael Inwood, Glossary of Some Key Terms, in G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
SPIRIT 323, 329 [hereinafter Inwood Glossary].
39. Id.
40. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 175.
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[T]he actual substance [] is a people, and as actual consciousness a citizen of that people.
This consciousness has its essence in the simple spirit, and the certainty of itself
in the actuality of this spirit, in the people as a whole, and immediately therein
it has its truth, thus not in something that is not actual, but in a spirit that exists
and prevails.41

In this sense, the Geist can also be called “human law” because it includes
the universality of law, government, and custom.42 Borrowing from this
broad concept of Hegel’s Geist, Gadamer frequently invoked the Geist in
hermeneutics, as did Schleiermacher, in terms of the “objectification of
spirit.”43
The discussion relating to Geist brings forth the idea of objectification, as
well as the difference between an “I and Thou” relationship among humans
versus the “I and It” relationship between a person and an object.44 The
term objectify can have a German translation to vergegenständlichen, versachlichen,
and objektivieren; furthermore, although this term can be used in a derogative
sense to mean the “depriv[ation] of inner soul” or “to violate,”45 this term
can also be used to mean “give objective form to” or to “regard [something]
as an object” for the purpose of analyzing it as a datum.46 Habermas, in his
lecture on Martin Buber, explained that a dialogical “I-Thou” relationship
exists between a speaker who addresses a person, with that person able to
become a speaker in turn and address the first speaker.47 While with an
object, “the observer’s gaze is fixed on asymmetrically upon an object—

41. Id. at 177.
42. Id.
43. See BETTI, supra note 8, at 7 (devoting a chapter to “Objectivations of the spirit”); see also
GADAMER, supra note 9, at 336 (criticizing “the objectifying replacement of the interpreter by the
original reader” of a text); SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 210–12 (discussing the debate between
Ast and Wolf with regard to the need to understand the spirit of the author and the spirit of the relevant
age).
44. See Jürgen Habermas, A Philosophy of Dialogue (May 2012), in DIALOGUE AS A TRANSDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT 11 (Paul Mendes-Flohr ed., 2015) (“The interpersonal relationship between
a first and a second person, between an ‘I’ and a ‘Thou,’ is different in kind from the objectifying
relationship between a third person and an object, between an ‘I’ and an ‘It’.”).
45. HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 13. The connection between labor and the objectification
of human spirit is one of the issues which must be discussed when approaching art or text produced
by humans. This critical sense of objectify originates with Karl Marx and his critique of Hegel and the
nature of capitalism, which turns people’s labor “into petrified objects that stand over against us with
an apparent magical life of their own.” Id. at 14.
46. Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Habermas, supra note 44, at 11.
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which cannot return the gaze of the observer.”48 With a “Thou,” the focus
is selective on the essential features of the person, while with an object the
observer shifts from one detail to another.49 Nonetheless, a person can
have a “shielded ego[]” where they end up separating themselves and
treating others “not as second persons but as objects—not as partners in
dialogue, but instrumentally, like a doctor operating on the body of a patient,
or strategically, like a clever bank manager palming off loans upon his
customers.”50 This is a twofold concept in that the person addressed must
also be open to being confronted by another in the “I-Thou” relationship.51
IV. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF HERMENEUTICS
For romantic hermeneutics, Schleiermacher’s goal was “a general
hermeneutics which sets forth the art of understanding every linguistic
statement, oral and written.”52 However, in his academy address in 1829,
Schleiermacher presented the real difficulty of finding a unified method of
hermeneutics, and provided the best criticism of his own early works:
[F]or my own sake as well as for that of my audience, when I began to lecture
on hermeneutics I searched for the best treatment of the method. But my
search was in vain. Neither the numerous theological compendia—though
many of them, such as Ernesti’s book, are considered products of sound
philological study—nor even the few purely philological essays on
interpretation offered more than compilations of individual rules extracted
from the researches of the masters. Moreover, although these rules were
sometimes clear, frequently they were quite ambiguous; and although they
were now and again arranged in a helpful fashion, at other times the
arrangement was unsatisfactory.53

Schleiermacher’s statement could have just as easily been made today
directed at the countless canons of textual construction being provided in
the legal field, with many of these canons disorganized, ambiguous, or

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 3.
Id. at 176 (footnote omitted).
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contradictory; however, none of these defects have prevented these canons
from continuing to propagate and motivate scholarly research.54
In this vein, the Supreme Court of the United States recently
demonstrated the evident problems with the use of romantic hermeneutics
in its opinion in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid.55 In Duguid, the Court’s majority
opinion relied on several somewhat contradictory canons of statutory
construction to justify the judgment;56 however, in a concurrence,
Justice Alito pointed out that the canons being used were not particularly
helpful in the case and the existence of those canons is merely “an attempt
to describe the English language as it is actually used.”57 Despite
recognizing the problems with canons of construction, Justice Alito’s hope
for solving these problems rests in his statement: “[P]erhaps someday it will
be possible to evaluate these canons by conducting what is called a corpus
linguistics analysis, that is, an analysis of how particular combinations of
words are used in a vast database of English prose.”58 In reading the Duguid
opinion, one can see many parallels to the reasoning from Schleiermacher’s
1819 Compendium—particularly with regard to Schleiermacher’s focus on
grammatical interpretation through a detailed understanding of language.59

54. See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788,
795 (2018) (discussing the various interpretations of the “ordinary meaning” rule of construction); see
also Bradley Silverman, Statutory Ambiguity in King v. Burwell: Time for a Categorical Chevron Rule,
125 YALE L.J. F. 44, 45 (2015) (discussing the difficulty in constructing clear statutory language which
may contradict clear legislative history); M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 329,
354–55, 379, 385 (1819) (utilizing several canons of construction, including preeminence of the 1st U.S.
Congress, the long practice of supporting constitutionality of that practice, the rule that revisions of
text should look to changes in words, the special attention given to similar words being used differently,
and the rule that structure of a document helps understand meaning, etc.); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd.
of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 376, 378, 384 (2006) (making use of canons instructing that words not
defined, or terms of art, are used in their ordinary usage; words are known by the company they keep;
changes in definitions are intentional; and including language in one area and omitting it in another is
presumed to be intentional).
55. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
56. See id. at 1169–72 (relying on the “series-qualifier canon” for the premise that a modifier at
the end of a list modifies every member in the list while rejecting the application of the “rule of last
antecedent,” which provides that limiting terms only modify the preceding term; rejecting the
“distributive canon” which requires application of modifiers by context of the sentence, while noting
that in cases of “linguistically impossible” outcomes the canons of construction should not be applied).
57. Id. at 1174 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, THE CHICAGO GUIDE TO
GRAMMAR, USAGE, AND PUNCTUATION 1 (2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id.
59. See SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 117–22 (discussing the necessity of building a highly
detailed understanding of the author’s language when interpreting texts).
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Romantic hermeneutics emphasizes the hermeneutic circle to explain that
to understand the whole of a text, one must understand the parts and vice
versa.60 This observation, beyond being logically circular, can also be seen
as something relating to a quasi-method of interpretation. Presumably, if
some text is unclear or illogical when read in isolation, that same text may
make certain sense when read in context with other material.61 Even in
recent times, the U.S. Supreme Court continues to repeat this very intuitive
canon.62 Another frequently used canon of construction relates to the
effort of obtaining the original intention of the author, which, according to
Schleiermacher, means one must know the author better than the author
knows himself.63 Finally, this search for apparent objectivity was also
presented by the historicist movement, which wanted interpretation to
completely eliminate the present standpoint and instead seek “total
immersion in the ethos of the chosen period.”64 In the words of Leopold
von Ranke, “Some have endowed history with the task to pass judgment on
the past, and to educate the world for the benefit of years to come. The
present essay does not lay claim to an office as high as this: it only wants to
say how things actually were.”65
With Gadamer, hermeneutics moved further away from canons, and even
from an art of construction, and towards textual interpretations
phenomenologically. In the words of Gadamer in his letter to Betti:
“Fundamentally, I am not proposing a method; I am describing what is the case.
That it is as I describe it cannot, I think, be seriously questioned.”66 In
response, Betti criticized Gadamer, saying “what actually happens” does not
deal with the epistemological problem of justification of knowledge.67
Nonetheless, Gadamer’s approach does obtain justification of knowledge,
which is done ultimately through the model of the Platonic dialectic.68 The

60. HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 37.
61. See id. (recommending the reader “exhaust all possibilities” before concluding an author
contradicted themselves or made a logical error).
62. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (“[A] word is known by the company
it keeps . . . .”).
63. SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 112; HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 31.
64. HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 31.
65. Lars Vinx, Some Untidy Reflections on the Betti-Gadamer Debate, in EMILIO BETTI,
HERMENEUTICS AS A GENERAL METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT 17 n.2 (Mariano
Croce & Marco Goldoni eds., Routledge 2021) (1962) (citation omitted).
66. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 512.
67. BETTI, supra note 8, at 61.
68. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 356.
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Platonic “dialectic proceeds by way of question and answer” which involves
bringing a question whose answer is not yet settled into the open for
discussion.69 What is questioned “has to be brought into this state of
indeterminacy, so that there is an equilibrium between the pro and
contra.”70 However, the question’s horizon binds openness of the question
and requires establishing the presuppositions to understand what part of the
question remains open.71 The art of dialectic is to seek truth from
questioning, to test with questions, and to prevent suppression of
questions.72 The Socratic dialogue is between partners in dialogue, but it
looks at the logic of the subject matter which is revealed in the dialogue. 73
The dialectic “is the art of forming concepts through” forming common
meanings.74 The dialogue is an interactive form of question and answer
which requires the bringing of an alienated text back into conversation.75
“When it is interpreted, written tradition is brought back out of the
alienation in which it finds itself and into the living present of conversation,
which is always fundamentally realized in question and answer.”76 A similar
dialectic can be seen in Hegel’s preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit, where
Hegel criticizes a hypothetical geometer who learns the relationship of
angles within triangles by empirically measuring many triangles instead of
relying on mathematical proofs.77 The fault of this empirical geometer is in
his failure to understand that the mathematical proof is external to the object
(the specific triangles).78 From this foundation, Hegel explains that in
philosophical cognition there is not only the ontological knowledge, such as
in mathematics, but also that knowledge then moves to the mind and
culminates in philosophy and logic.79
In Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory, he relies on Plato’s dialectic to justify
the truth obtained from hermeneutics through logos; however, to obtain
this truth, it is necessary to understand how a dialogue can occur and the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 357.
Id.
See id. (“A question that lacks this horizon is, so to speak, floating.”).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361–62.
Id. at 362.
HEGEL, supra note 11, at 20; Michael Inwood, Commentary, in G.W.F. HEGEL, THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 331, 353–54 (Michael Inwood trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2018)
[hereinafter Inwood Commentary].
78. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 20; Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 353–54.
79. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 331, 353–54.
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need to resolve the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer relies on anticipations or
prejudices, in a neutral sense80 of the word, to enter into the hermeneutic
circle and engage in dialogue.81 This dialogue between the text and the
interpreter must reach an agreement to have a successful interpretation.82
According to Gadamer, all understanding must emerge entirely as a result
of prejudices which, when they are shown to be incorrect, are replaced with
new prejudices.83 These prejudices are the result of development (Bildung),
which Gadamer traces back to the concept of Geist as it is related to language
and culture.84 It is the temporal distance between the interpreter and the
text that: first allows for the use of productive prejudices to assist
understanding, and second, allows for the suppression of false prejudices
which result in misunderstandings.85 In this manner, the meaning and the
interpretation both occur in the present and require application.86
Gadamer’s explanation of a dialogue and the necessity of application not
only resolved the issue of epistemology and the issue relating to entering the
hermeneutic circle, but also eliminated the need for special hermeneutics for
normative interpretation, such as in the case of theology or law. The special
problem relating to law or theology was that law or theology has to be
applied to specific current circumstances and the text must be interpreted
in light of these circumstances.87 Lars Vinx put the problem eloquently by
noting that “juristic hermeneutics must rely on an idealizing method that
does not aim to track the actual psychological intentions of the lawgiver, but
80. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 273 (“The history of ideas shows that not until the
Enlightenment does [the concept of prejudice] acquire the negative connotation familiar today.
Actually ‘prejudice’ means a judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation
have been finally examined. In German legal terminology a ‘prejudice’ is a provisional legal verdict
before the final verdict is reached.”).
81. See GRONDIN, supra note 21, at 85 (noting debate about anticipations is necessary to develop
or change them).
82. See id. at 126 (“To understand . . . is primarily to agree . . . with somebody about a thing, an
understanding which has the mode of agreement (or an explanation).”).
83. See id. at 85 (observing there can be no understanding without the existence of prejudice);
see also GADAMER, supra note 9, at 269 (“A person who is trying to understand a text is always
projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in
the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular
expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly
revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there.”).
84. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 13 (describing the historical and linguistic concepts that make
up “prejudices”).
85. See GRONDIN, supra note 21, at 89 (listing the effects of “temporal distance”).
86. Id. at 101.
87. Id. at 108.
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rather to ensure that the application of laws to particular cases leads to
reasonable outcomes.”88 Quoting Hobbes, Lars Vinx continues: “The
Intention of the Legislature is always[] supposed to be equity: For it were a
great contumely for a [j]udge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne.”89
Gadamer used this problem of legal hermeneutics to make a broader
application of the necessity of the past and present to penetrate historically
affected consciousness,90 and to reject the philologist’s understanding their
texts only for their vestiges of a grand narrative of history rather than for
their meaning.91 In effect, Gadamer rejected interpretation guided by
“purely philological criteria of fidelity to the original” and required
interpretation that is guided “by a process of convergence between different
historical outlooks: by what [Gadamer] calls a ‘fusion of horizons’
(Horizontverschmelzung) between the world of the interpreters and the world
of the interpretandum.”92 The interpretation of texts done by a judge or a
legal historian must require the same effort and reflection and there is only
a need for a single hermeneutics.93 In all hermeneutics, “the meaning to be
understood is concretised and fully reali[z]ed only in interpretation, but the
interpretive activity considers itself wholly bound by the meaning of the text.
Neither jurist nor theologian regards the work of application as making free
with the text.”94
Having covered the core idea of philosophical hermeneutics, I now turn
to a brief discussion of critical hermeneutics along with the GadamerHabermas debate over issues of historical tradition and cultural authority
versus enlightenment and critique of ideology.95 Both Gadamer and
Habermas would agree that all interpretation should be done in the form of
a dialogue to form a consensus across time and cultural distance; researchers
should not attempt to overcome their values which serve as preconditions
to understanding; and, failure to enter into a dialogue objectifies the text in

88. Vinx, supra note 65, at 12.
89. Id.
90. See GRONDIN, supra note 21, at 110 (stating philology and history together make for clearer
understanding).65
91. Id. at 109.
92. HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 29–30.
93. See GRONDIN, supra note 21, at 107 (relaying how the level of attention given to the
interpretation of a text is the same between those inside and outside the legal field).
94. Id. at 108.
95. See HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 23 (mentioning the core points of the GadamerHabermas debate).
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a problematic way.96 Habermas believes that Gadamer’s approach to
interpretation gives the author of the text and the author’s viewpoint too
much influence on the interpretation of the text simply because of its
otherness in relationship to the interpreter.97 Habermas also supports
Donald Davidson’s belief that an interpreter should be charitable in
understanding the unfamiliar or the apparently irrational in order to have a
basis for obtaining the truth.98 Beyond this foundation, Habermas claims
an interpreter’s right to criticize others and the interpreter’s assessment of
validity claims within the text is a part of the process of determining
meaning.99 According to Habermas, to take a text’s claim seriously, the
interpreter must be willing to engage with the text’s propositional truth,
moral-practical righteousness, and aesthetic-expressive authenticity.100
Overall, Habermas’s approach is guided by the “‘emancipatory interest’ of
the critical social sciences in social self-reali[z]ation and autonomy,
represented by the paradigm cases of Marxian ideology-critique and
Freudian psychoanalysis.”101 Although Habermas makes critique of
underlying texts more explicit than Gadamer, Gadamer’s reference to a
Platonic dialectic involving dialogue would already include many of the ideas
from Habermas. Therefore, Gadamer and Habermas can generally be
treated analogously without focusing on their distinct areas of emphasis.
After our discussion of Gadamerian hermeneutics, it would only be
appropriate to mention concerns that are directly evident from the
Gadamerian approach. The first concern relates to the peculiarity of the
“imaginary dialogue.”102 The second concern is that the dialogue described
by Gadamer appears to reach understanding simply for the sake of reaching
understanding rather than for the goal-oriented purposes of the text and the
interpreter.103 The third concern relates to the validity and objectivity of
an interpretation as a result of the value-judgments imbedded in the

96. See id. at 1–2 (showing agreement from two different experts in how to go about interpreting
a text correctly).
97. Id. at 32–33.
98. Id at 37 (“If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a
creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason
to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything.”).
99. See id. at 33 (moving on to the next step in determining meaning).
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. at 18.
102. Id. at 110.
103. Id.
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interpretation.104 Betti takes a particular exception to the subjective
approach of interpretation since such an approach completely eliminates the
canon of hermeneutic autonomy and risks the interpreter doing nothing
more than simply re-enforcing their “pre-understandings.”105
At this point, having covered the overall debate within hermeneutics, I
must delve deeper into the core thinking behind hermeneutics. I undertake
this process of going into greater detail after providing a general summary
as a means to mimic a “fusion of horizons,” which completes and merges
understandings of prior authors of hermeneutics with my own
understanding and the understanding of the reader of this Article.
Consequently, it is now appropriate to focus in great detail on four key
scholars in hermeneutics: Hegel, Schleiermacher, Betti, and Gadamer. After
a more thorough understanding of the concepts of hermeneutics is
achieved, a section on the application of hermeneutics to legal research will
provide a bridge between the theory of textual analysis and its
application.106
V. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of truth.
To help bring philosophy closer to the form of science—to the goal of its
being able to give up the name of love of knowledge and become actual
knowledge—that is what I have set out to do. The inner necessity that
knowledge should be science lies in its nature, and the only satisfactory
explanation of this is the presentation of philosophy itself.107—Hegel

Hegel provides a more detailed understanding of the underlying concepts
of hermeneutics; nonetheless, some of Hegel’s thoughts are in direct
response to the works of Schleiermacher and Schleiermacher’s followers.108
Schleiermacher’s and Hegel’s life, as well as their works, were contemporary
104. See id. at 117 (questioning how valid an interpretation can be if value-judgements are
integral to the process).
105. See BETTI, supra note 8, at 40 (recognizing others have also questioned and found fault with
Gadamer’s way of reaching understanding).
106. Vertsman, supra note 6 (undertaking a united legal interpretation theory separate from the
methodology often presented in legal opinions).
107. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 6.
108. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, BRITANNICA ACAD., https://academic.eb.com/
levels/collegiate/article/Georg-Wilhelm-Friedrich-Hegel/108411 [https://perma.cc/9L9V-X7TX]
[hereinafter Georg Wilhelm] (explaining Hegel criticized Schleiermacher school for elevating “feeling to
a place in religion above systemic theology”).
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with each other,109 raising issues regarding the use of the same terms, which
differ in their definitions. Namely, Schleiermacher’s reference to spirit is
primarily related to the Holy Spirit of the Christian religion and
Schleiermacher’s reference to feeling refers to the religious feeling or intuition
of the Christian God that works within the human experience.110 By
contrast with Schleiermacher, Hegel’s understandings of the Holy Spirit,
Christianity, and Jesus were inspired by Kant’s belief that Christianity was
following a pattern of “rational morality” that could be grasped by
reason.111 In accordance with this belief, Hegel sought to reinterpret the
Christian Gospel and to understand Christianity through reason.112
In that vein, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit will serve as our basic dictionary
for the concepts of Bildung, common sense (including, “genius” and feeling),
and Geist. In following Hegel’s explanations, we will be able to address the
philosophical foundation of these theological concepts to approximate the
understanding of Schleiermacher, Betti, and Gadamer discussed below. A
discussion of the influence that Hegel had on Karl Marx113 and the
potential to eliminate the theological basis behind Hegel’s philosophy is
beyond the scope of this Article. Due to some ambiguity in translation
between German and English, and due to the usefulness of direct
quotations, the word spirit and the word Geist will be generally used
interchangeably within this Article.
Although Hegel is crucial for our understanding of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics, his works are notoriously difficult to interpret either in terms
of individual sentences or in terms of the whole work.114 One of the key
difficulties is Hegel’s usage of German words with multiple meanings being
implied or used at the same time. Furthermore, these meanings shift
109. Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Hegel (1770–1831) moved to Berlin in 1807 and 1818,
respectively where Schleiermacher was a professor of theology and Hegel was chair of philosophy.
Friedrich Schleiermacher, BRITANNICA ACADEMIC, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/
Friedrich-Schleiermacher/66148 [https://perma.cc/TW6K-RU85]; Georg Wilhelm, supra note 108.
Schleiermacher’s Die Weihnachtsfeier and Der christliche Gaube were published in 1805 and 1821,
respectively, while Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes was published in 1807. See Georg Wilhelm, supra
note 108 (comparing the timeline of events in Hegel’s life with Schleiermacher’s life); Friedrich
Schleiermacher, supra note 109 (laying out the life Friedrich Schleiermacher).
110. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, supra note 109 (providing an overview of Schleiermacher’s career
as a theologian and his understanding of “feeling” as a core part of the religious experience of God).
111. See Georg Wilhelm, supra note 108 (noting Kant’s influence on Hegel’s own beliefs).
112. See id. (discussing the effect of Kant’s philosophies on Hegel’s religious understanding).
113. See id. (acknowledging but not discussing Hegel’s influence on Marx).
114. Michael Inwood, Editor’s Introduction, in G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
SPIRIT vii, vii [hereinafter Inwood Editor’s Introduction].
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through their usage, and the reader is often left to determine the specific
meaning or meanings that are intended.115 This is further exemplified with
the word “aufheben,” which translates as “sublate” and has the simultaneous
meanings of elevate, destroy, and preserve.116 In this respect, it is important
to repeatedly emphasize that this section’s purpose is not to provide an
analysis or an overview of Hegel’s philosophy, but rather to briefly provide
the necessary background of some vocabulary and philosophy for a more
comprehensive understanding of hermeneutics.
A. Bildung
The German word “Bildung” is very difficult to interpret, with different
translators assigning a different equivalent English word; furthermore,
Bildung has changed its meaning and evolved over its usage since the
eighteenth century.117 Gadamer believes that Hegel has provided a good
foundation on the meaning of “Bildung” and the connection between Bildung
and the phenomenology of the Geist.118 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel
used Bildung to mean: education and culture, which suggests cultivating and
forming (bilden).119
1.

Education

Bildung as education relates to the movement from the initial sensory
consciousness which lacks spirit through the long course of becoming
authentic knowledge through the generation of an element of science as a
pure concept of science in itself.120 Hegel further explains that the process
of education of the universal human individual is done through the
education of individual people, who move from their existence only for
themselves and towards the collective human universal individual, which is
also undergoing education.121 This relationship between the education of
the universal spirit and the single entity is linked since the single entity must

115. See id. at vii n.1 (noting the difficulty a person may have read Hegel’s work outside the
original language).
116. See id. (providing an example of some of the difficulties of translating a written work from
one language to another).
117. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 8–15 (discussing the meaning and etymology of Bildung).
118. Id. at 11.
119. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 449.
120. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 14.
121. See id. (describing Hegel’s idea of the process of the universal human individual’s
education).
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also pass through educational stages of the universal spirit with earlier stages
“prepared and levelled.”122
[The] former ages occupied [by] men of mature spirit, [have] been reduced to
the level of information, exercises, and even games of boyhood[.] . . .
[E]ducation, considered from the side of the individual, consists in his
acquiring what is thus present before him, absorbing into himself his inorganic
nature, and taking possession of it for himself. But, considered from the side
of the universal spirit as substance, this is nothing but the fact that the
substance gives itself its self-consciousness, and produces its becoming and
its reflection into itself.123

The role of science is to present the education that “has already been
reduced to a moment and property of spirit.”124 The goal of science is to
understand the “spirit’s insight into . . . knowledge[,]” which requires
focusing in detail on each individual shape of the spirit and of the individual,
which in turn is accomplished by taking the current spirit and deconstructing
it.125 In other words, the education of the universal individual or world
Geist leads to the secondary education of an individual into world culture,
which leads to the tertiary education of Hegel’s students.126 Through this
process of education, there is no sublation of the prior forms of the Geist,
but rather the prior forms remain represented and recollected by the Geist
without the Geist expending any effort on those forms.127 Likewise,
education is the historical progress of “genuine” philosophy and other
disciplines, as well as the progress of the individual who can produce
genuine philosophy that “lies at the end of a long journey of education, a
movement as rich as it is profound, through which spirit arrives at
knowledge.”128
Speaking in a more pedestrian manner, the education (Bildung) of the
individual, science, and the Geist happen together so that when individuals
122. See id. at 15 (connecting two seemingly opposite concepts and explaining how the two are
connected).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 343–44 (following the process of second and
tertiary education of the universal individual).
127. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 15.
128. Id. at 31. This relates to the difference between “education” producing “genuine”
philosophy in contrast to “common sense.” Further discussion on this topic is provided in the section
on “common sense.” Infra Part V.B. Common Sense, Genius, and Feeling.
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undergo education, science and Geist are also educated and the more
educated Geist produces future individuals that start at a more educated level
and undergo further education. Consequently, education of the Geist
involves individuals folding into and out of the Geist and undergoing their
individual education. Science effectively deconstructs and structures this
education of the Geist. Throughout this process of education, the less
educated forms of Geist do not get completely eliminated as in the case of a
transformation where the new form destroys the old form, but rather get
reduced into background knowledge which can be recalled at any time but
is not something which requires continuous focus or effort.
2.

Culture (Bildung), Cultivating, and Forming (Bilden)

When referring to “culture” as Bildung, it becomes necessary to consider
the relationship between Geist and its “realm of culture.”129 Culture as
being used in reference to Bildung involves self-consciousness giving up its
individuality and cultivating itself into a universal through “every aspect of
social life.”130 “Culture” is the movement of consciousness into leaving
itself behind in order to integrate into a culture so that the individual no
longer exists but rather becomes a “soul of its society.”131 Culture or
Bildung emerges from the “immediacy of substantial life;” then this
beginning of culture unfolds to the “serious business of ‘life in its
fullness.’”132
This concept of bilden as forming or cultivating is demonstrated in part
through the lordship and bondage dialectic.133 Briefly speaking, the
lordship bondage dialectic revolves around the self-consciousness obtaining
its pure abstraction of existence for itself and for another through a battle
with another self-consciousness.134 The self-consciousness sees its
existence as life, but the self-consciousness is not certain of itself or of
another self-consciousness since it is not being recognized by the other selfconsciousness.135 To achieve the truth of existence of itself and the other,
129. See HEGEL, supra note 11, at 175 (introducing the idea of “realm of culture” and how it
applies to the concept of Geist).
130. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 449.
131. Id. at 450.
132. Id. at 331.
133. See HEGEL, supra note 11, at 96 (describing the concepts of lordship and bondage and how
it relates to Bilden).
134. See id. at 78 (describing the confronting nature of consciousness to ascertain its existence
separate from its existence in life).
135. Id.
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the self-consciousness needs to show a disassociation from any physical
existence (i.e., life).136 This is done through itself and through the other:
the self-consciousness must pursue the death of the other selfconsciousness while also risking its own life.137 This way, the selfconsciousness proves that life is nothing but a vanishing moment for it, and
likewise for the other self-consciousness since,
as each stakes its life, so each must aim at the other’s death; for it values
the other no more than itself; its essence presents itself to it as an other,
it is outside itself and must sublate its Being-outside-itself; the other is
a manifoldly entangled consciousness that simply is; it must intuit its
otherness as pure Being-for-itself or as absolute negation.138
If one or both die in this “trial by death,” then no recognition can be
obtained from the dead person or to the dead person; therefore, it is
necessary that both survive this trial.139 If both do survive this trial, then
one will be an “independent consciousness” or the lord, and the other will
be a “dependent consciousness” or the bondsman.140
This role of the lord as the independent consciousness and the bondsman
as the dependent consciousness reverses itself.141 This reversal occurs for
the lord because the bondsman is an object for the lord and lacks
independent consciousness; therefore, the bondsman is unable to provide
the lord with his certainty of existence.142 For the servile consciousness of
the bondsman, its independent consciousness and existence is established
by its overwhelming fear of the death and of the lord.143 Therefore,
through its serving, the fixed elements in the servant have been dissolved
and what was left was pure essence of self-consciousness for itself, but not
an existence for itself.144 This existence for itself is cultivated through work

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (footnote omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 79; see also Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 400 (discussing the existence of the
lord and bondsman internally in one person versus their existence externally in two persons).
141. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 80.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 80–81 (explaining how the act of serving strips the bondsman of any ability to
exist for a reason other than serving the lord).
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as desire which is “held in check” or resisted.145 Likewise, in relation to an
object, for the worker the object maintains its permanence and
independence; by contrast, in the case of a fulfilled desire, the object
disappears and lacks the objective side or subsistence (i.e., the object is
consumed by the lord).146 This creates a permanence of self-consciousness
as existing for itself; furthermore, the cultivating of the object has resulted
in the sublating of the form of the lord so the servant consciousness takes
the place of the lord as its own negative essence becomes for itself an
existence for itself.147 “Through this rediscovery of itself by itself, the
serving consciousness realizes that it is precisely in its labour, wherein it
seemed to have only an alienated mind, that it acquires a mind of its
own.”148 This occurs through the modes of service, fear, cultivating, and
through the forming of consciousness.149
In a separate discussion, Hegel considers how the individual cultivates
itself into culture150 and into the Geist, which is pure culture.151 The Geist
cultivates itself into a new form of Geist.152 According to Hegel, the
“individuality cultivates itself into what it is in itself, and only by so doing is
it in itself and has actual Being-there; it has as much actuality and power as
it has culture.”153 In this transformation of the estrangement of the
individual is the transition from thought to actuality and from determinate
individuality into essentiality.154 The culture of the single individual is the
individuality cultivating itself—“the coming about of the individuality as the
universal, objective essence, i.e. the coming about of the actual world.”155
The individual estranges itself and becomes realized in its culture and its
own actuality.156 As the individual “has been refined by the culture of
service into pure existence, . . . there is present the spirit of this real world of
145. Id. at 81.
146. See id. (demonstrating what could happen if the sense of existence for itself is not
cultivated).
147. See id. (reaching the pinnacle of the switch between the bondsman and lord roles of
consciousness).
148. Id.
149. See id. (recognizing reaching existence for itself is not possible without these elements).
150. Id. at 196–97.
151. Id. at 208.
152. Id. at 320–21.
153. Id. at 196.
154. See id. (observing the results of the transformation of the individual).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 197 (stating the next step of the individual’s transformation to reach
understanding).
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culture, a spirit conscious of itself in its truth and of its concept.”157 The
movement of the individual as refined by culture brings forth the Geist of
the “real world of culture,” which is the pure culture and isolation of
actuality and thought.158
Hegel’s use of Bildung and bilden through the translated words of culture,
cultivating, and forming goes far beyond the ordinary usage of those words
in the English language. Hagel uses the culture and cultivating as something
more fundamental in terms of the steps of the individual into existence, then
into Geist, then Geist into further iteration of Geistes, which in turn is the
infinitude of God.159
B. Common Sense, Genius, and Feeling
The familiar in general, precisely because it is well-known, is not known. The
commonest way in which we deceive ourselves and deceive others is to
presuppose in inquiry something as familiar, and to accept it automatically;
for all its talking to and fro, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it does
not know what is happening to it.160

In this manner, Hegel is highly critical of philosophers who support their
arguments based on common sense, genius, or feeling. Hegel goes on to
castigate his contemporary philosophers, especially those relying on genius
even further:
It is not pleasant to observe that ignorance and the crudity without form or
taste, that cannot itself focus its thinking on a single abstract proposition, still
less on the connection of several propositions, sometimes claims to be
freedom and tolerance of thinking, sometimes even genius. Genius, as we
know, was once all the rage in poetry, as it now is in philosophy; but when the
production of this genius made any sense, instead of poetry it generated trivial
prose or, if it went beyond that, deranged speeches.161

According to Hegel, genuine philosophy must take the long journey to arrive
at knowledge, rather than attempting any shortcuts through common sense

157. Id. at 207–08 (footnote omitted).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 207–08, 321 (“[F]rom the chalice of this realm of spirits foams forth for Him his
own infinitude.”).
160. Id. at 16.
161. Id. at 31.
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or through genius, to obtain an immediate revelation of divine
knowledge.162 In contrast to common sense, genius is supposedly available
to very few individuals, but both common sense and genius are a form of
natural philosophizing providing immediate knowledge.163
Hegel’s criticism of common sense is not so much for its pretentiousness
or its generation of “deranged speeches,” but rather in its logical
inconsistency. First, Hegel criticizes common sense for revealing nothing
more than trivial truths, which are purported to have significance in the
heart or pure consciousness and are supposedly also in the hearts of
others.164 Consequently, this common sense is purported to be self-evident
and cannot be challenged; however, explaining this common sense is a waste
of time since it has been long available in popular proverbs or
catechisms.165 Furthermore, these truths that are found in common sense
are often contradictory, which often forces those who advance these truths
to fall into further confusion or into outbursts where they arbitrarily claim
that a certain truth must prevail.166 However, Hegel’s most stinging
criticism for common sense comes from showing there is a contradiction
between common sense, which is supposedly divinely inspired, and the
human nature of reasoning:
Since common sense appeals to feeling, to its internal oracle, it has nothing to
do with anyone who does not agree; it must explain that it has nothing more
to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in himself;—in other
words, it tramples underfoot the root of humanity. For it is the nature of
humanity to press for agreement with others, and its existence resides only in
the achieved community of consciousnesses. The anti-human, the bestial,
consists in confinement to feeling, and in being able to communicate only by
this means.167

Hegel ends his discussion on common sense and genius by criticizing the
former as laziness and the latter as conceit.168 In the same vein, Hegel also
162. Id.
163. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 367 (referencing the Kantian concept of genius as a
“talent for producing something for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition
consisting of a skill for something that can be learned by following some rule or other.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 31–32.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 32.
168. Id. (dispelling a “gift of reason corrupting itself by indolence and conceit of genius”).
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criticizes reliance on secondary sources, such as summaries and prefaces of
philosophical works, since such reliance creates a deceptive feeling of
understanding or revelation of thoughts that are immediate and overly
simple.169 For Hegel, there are no shortcuts of genius or common sense;
rather, understanding is achieved only through the effort of “self-conscious
reason.”170
C. The Geist
The purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit is to understand the nature of
Geist while being within the Geist.171 This is a problem analogous to
recreating the map of the Earth while sitting behind a desk in a single
building. This brings forth a great deal of philosophy underlying
hermeneutics as a theory of human understanding, which must trace its
roots back to some modicum of commonality. Hegel outlines a system
finding this commonality in the form of the Geist, which is the “I that is We,
and We that is I.”172 However, beyond this pithy statement, the Geist takes
on various forms, which are all in coexistence and, for our purposes, both
supplement and replace the Christian God within this dialectic.
Future authors, such as Gadamer, use the term Geist, and this term
becomes the very basis for some of the theories of hermeneutics discussed
in this Article. For Hegel, the Geist is not a single Geist in a state of stasis,
but rather multiple manifestations of Geist that exist simultaneously while
also evolving and becoming the Geist’s more advanced forms.173 Therefore,
it is not enough to see a reference to the Geist, and it is important to
understand which manifestation is being referenced. However, Hegel
himself changed his partitioning of the Geist in the Phenomenology of Spirit; for
example, “[i]n Enc. III, Hegel explicitly distinguishe[d] three stages of
[Geist]”: subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute spirit.174 The
subjective spirit would be the individual mind, while the objective spirit
included the collective life of a people, and the absolute spirit would include
art, religion, and philosophy.175 By contrast, in the Phenomenology of Spirit,
Hegel organizes the Geist in four moments: “consciousness, self169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Inwood Editor’s Introduction, supra note 114, at xi–xii.
HEGEL, supra note 11, at 76.
Inwood Editor’s Introduction, supra note 114, at vii-viii.
Inwood Glossary, supra note 38, at 329.
Id.
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consciousness, reason, and spirit[,]”176 which are completed through
religion into the whole Geist.177 Consciousness is the understanding of
one’s own existence and self-consciousness is the understanding of the
existence of others.178 However, reason involves going beyond one’s self
through the law of the heart, which is the law that goes beyond the individual
and aims towards the universal and is then cultivated towards virtue.179
Then, Geist, as reason, considers the phenomenon of a produced work.180
Consciousness bifurcates the physical work between the author’s intended
work and the actual work, which is taken away from the author and
dissolved among universal consciousness.181 The spirit, as part of the Geist,
refers to the commonwealth or society as a whole where the individual is
absorbed into an “ethical substance.”182 Religion then combines all the
shapes or attributes of Geist into the whole spirit and is then turned into the
completed “world-spirit,” which allows the emergence of science as the
“spirit’s true knowledge of itself.”183
To further elucidate on the four moments of Geist, religion, and the whole
spirit, we must now take all of these moments in turn. This exercise of
taking the long-way to our understanding of hermeneutics will draw out the
Geist paradigm and provide the foundation for our interpretation of the
remainder of this Article.
1.

Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

The first two forms of Geist relate to a consciousness’s existence or
emergence of which another consciousness recognizes and becomes a selfconsciousness. For the purpose of our discussions of hermeneutics, these
forms of Geist relate to the individual beyond their physical life,184 the
existence of these forms the bondsman subsequently recognizes, dialectic
discussed above. Hence, these forms provide for the two most basic

176. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 269–70.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 272–73.
179. Inwood Glossary, supra note 38, at 272–73.
180. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 161.
181. Id. at 161–63.
182. Id. at 174–75.
183. Id. at 318.
184. See Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 373 (explaining the “soul” is analogous to a “natural
consciousness” and the soul replaces the “subjective spirit,” or the “individual mind,” before it acquires
complete self-knowledge for the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit as compared to the “Enc. III”).
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elements of Geist before it moves beyond itself and towards its forms as
reason and the commonwealth.
The consciousness forms the initial element of Geist, which starts from a
natural consciousness seeking true knowledge.185 In this manner, the
natural consciousness pursues knowledge through various forms promoting
a purified form of Geist and, by fully experiencing itself, it becomes “aware[]
of what it is in itself.”186 The experiences that consciousness undergoes
and understands are, in fact, the whole system of consciousness and the
whole of the truth of Geist.187 The forms of consciousness, which are a
form of Geist, progress as knowledge itself—knowledge that goes beyond
what is limited to itself, and towards consciousness that understands its own
essence, leading to absolute knowledge.188
The step towards self-consciousness occurs when the consciousness
seeks an object of desire, which can even be the self-consciousness itself
making the self-consciousness both an “I” and an “object”.189 The selfconsciousness is the inflection point from which an individual
consciousness bound by its present perception of existence as the Geist
moves towards a more “diverse” self-consciousness, which, along with
other self-consciousnesses, unifies into the “I that is We, and We that is
I.”190 The lordship and bondage dialectic demonstrates that, through a
mortal struggle between two consciousnesses, the subservient
consciousness recognizes the existence of its labor and self-existence,
creating a self-consciousness.191 For the subservient consciousness, the
object of labor that was done for lord is separate from its consciousness;
thereby, causing the consciousness to become aware of itself as an essence
and creating “a consciousness that thinks or is a free self-consciousness.”192
This free self-consciousness is thinking and moving through concepts,
rather than shapes or representations, and finds these concepts as having an
existence distinct from the existence of self-consciousness, but not distinct
from the actual self-consciousness; since for a concept to exist, it must be

185. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 37.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 41–42.
188. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 379–80.
189. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 76.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 76–81 (discussing the emergence of the self-consciousness through the lordship
and bondage dialectic).
192. Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).
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conceptualized.193 This understanding leads to the conclusion that
consciousness is a “thinking essence.”194 Further, from this thinking
essence arises a representation of reason, which exists in itself as a certainty
of consciousness.195
2.

Reason

“[Reason] is certain of itself as actuality, or certain that actuality is none
other than itself; its thinking is itself immediately actuality; and thus it adopts
towards actuality the attitude of idealism.”196 Reason provides certainty to
“consciousness that it is all reality,” in which there are no other objects, and
consciousness is “all reality and all presence” expressed as “I am I”.197
“Reason appeals to the self-consciousness of each and every consciousness:
I am I, my object and essence is I; and no consciousness will deny reason
this truth.”198 However, in proclaiming itself the only essence to other selfconsciousness, reason also realizes that it must exist for an “other” as an
object and essence, or that it exists as an object and essence to itself;
consequently, reason is becoming conscious of itself as the world-spirit.199
Reason provides a pure abstraction and certainty of reality in the forms of
universals, such as the pure essentiality of things in the abstract.200 To
understand the Geist in the form of reason, we will go through reason in the
following four segments: observing reason, the law of the heart, the work
(the thing itself), and law giving and testing.
a.

Observing Reason

“Observing reason” relates to the certainty of one’s observations and
senses.201 Reason, which is deeper than the self-consciousness or the “pure
I,” sees itself in actuality and tries to find itself as a thing; however, reason
first must complete itself in order to experience itself before it can
experience other things.202 In contrast to self-consciousness, now the Geist
sees the objective reality in a superficial manner while maintaining the self193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 83 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 95–97.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 429.
Hegel, supra note 11, at 99.
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consciousness as the essence of reality.203 At this point, the selfconsciousness understands that there is another self-consciousness, which
is not a foreign object but rather that self-consciousness which recognizes
itself and is also part of itself—“it is spirit that has the certainty of having its
unity with itself in the duplication of its self-consciousness and in the
independence of both.”204 This observation is a key step towards
understanding the Geist as both the individual consciousness and the
community of individuals.
Through the life of the people, self-consciousness is actualized into reality
by having the self-consciousness see the independent thinghood of others
as a negative of itself.205 Reason acts as the “fluid universal substance” and
the “unchangeable simple thinghood.”206 This substance explodes into
many independent self-conscious essences and dissolves the absolute
existence from which these individual essences arose.207 For the individual
essence, the universal substance is the soul and essence, while for the
universal essence it is the work of the individual essences.208 This paradigm
conceptualizes an individual as part of the universal essence, which remains
a part of their being, while the communal absolute essence is the product of
individual activities.
b. Law of the Heart
The law of the heart is, in many ways, analogous to the concept of natural
law, the understanding of which can be traced at least back to Sophocles in
his play, Antigone,209 a play Hegel quotes in his discussion.210 Aristotle’s
Rhetoric, likewise referenced a universal law of nature presenting “a natural
justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no
association or covenant with each other.”211 St. Thomas Aquinas wrote

203. Id. at 141–42.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 141.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Richard W. Minadeo, Antigone’s Flaws, in SOPHOCLES’ OEDIPUS PLAYS: OEDIPUS
THE KING, OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, & ANTIGONE (Chelsea House Publishers 1996) 56, 57 (appealing
to a greater authority to justify the burial of her brother, despite doing so is in violation of the law of
the society in question).
210. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 173 (“Its life is not of yesterday or today, but everlasting, [a]nd
no one knows at what time it appeared.”).
211. I ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC 1373b, KAIROS, [https://perma.cc/S84X-BBZQ].
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that natural law “is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it.”212
St. Aquinas also provided a natural law framework, linking natural law to
“eternal law,” “divine law,” and to “human law.”213
According to Hegel, the law of the heart is immediately present in the
existence of self-consciousness and is a shape of self-consciousness, which
is immediately aware of the universal law within itself; however, unlike prior
shapes, this shape has its existence as a necessary or universal.214 In the
building of the law of the heart, the law is at first only for the consciousness
itself and is not yet actualized and is not yet a concept; however, the heart is
confronted with a contradiction between the heart and actuality.215 The
actuality has a law by which individuality is oppressed through “a violent
ordering of the world which contradicts the law of the heart” with humanity
not following “the law of the heart,” but rather being subject to an alien
necessity.216 This actuality over consciousness is the “discordant
relationship of individuality and its truth, the relationship of a cruel necessity
by which the former is oppressed.”217 To resolve this conflict, each
individual will find the “hearts of men themselves,” rather than a rigid law
opposing the individual.218 Finally, the individual consciousness will move
from being the immediate universality and the necessity of the heart and
towards the truth of the “universal in itself,” which is a singular consciousness
and the alienation of the individual.219 The individual finds the divine and
human order to be, in fact, “animated by the consciousness of all, that it is
the law of all hearts.”220 This leads the individual to actualize the law of its
own heart, becoming a part of the universal object in which the individual
does not recognize itself within the universal order.221 In this manner,
Hegel’s discussion of the law of the heart recognizes the individual
consciousness, and the universal consciousness as being intertwined and
being a common essence.

212. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I–II, Q. 94 art. 1 (Benziger Publ’g
Co. 1947), reprinted in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON LAW AND JUSTICE, EXCERPTS FROM SUMMA
THEOLOGICA 1008 (Leslie B. Adams, The Legal Classics Library 1988).
213. Id. at art. 4–5, 1011 (providing support for natural, eternal divine, and human law).
214. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 147.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 149.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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The Work (The Thing Itself)

The discussion on the work is as close as Hegel came to directly
addressing hermeneutics. According to Hegel, a work in effect becomes
two works: one is die Sache selbst (the Thing itself) and another is Sache (the
Thing), in turn, is comprised of what really matters in actuality and the Ding
(the thing), which is perceived within reality and remains insignificant.222
Through the movement of these forms, Hegel utilizes the work to show
how an individual creation of consciousness moves through actuality
towards being coopted by everyone and to become reformed into the Geist:
“The work is the reality which consciousness gives itself . . . .”223
An individual forms the work, and through the work an individual moves
through universality, and becomes the universal consciousness.224 This
universal consciousness goes beyond the determinate work and fills the
void, “which is left unfilled by the work.”225 In effect, the individual work
becomes foreign to the author and to others seeking to replace this work
and make the work their own such that the work and the author are lost.226
The individuality vanishes in the work, and the work holds supremacy over
the individual’s concept of self, becoming objective actuality.227 The
consciousness, the truth, only exists in “true work” from the unity of the
consciousness with its doing, existence, willing, and achieving.228 This
conflict between the objective actuality and the true work causes the
consciousness to reflect back into itself and, from the transient work,
consciousness can experience the momentary actuality of doing, then
establishing the unity of doing and universality.229 This unity is the Thing
itself “which[] endures independently of the Thing” or a thing which
depends on the individual doing, circumstances, means and actuality.230
There are two works: the permanent Thing itself, which is the ideal work
intended and is not reduced to actuality, and the Thing or a thing that is left

222. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 438. Although in German there is a clearer distinction
between the Thing itself, the Thing, and a thing, I use the English terms in order to avoid translation
errors.
223. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 161.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 437.
227. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 163.
228. Id.
229. Id. (existing in consciousness).
230. Id.
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to the circumstances of actuality.231 The Thing itself is likewise an
intersection and unity of actuality and individuality, the pure doing and the
doing of the specific individual, and the actuality existing for
consciousness.232 Therefore, the Thing itself shows the spiritual essentiality
in which consciousness is certain of itself as an objective essence or the
Thing that self-consciousness created as its own free and authentic
object.233 It is through self-consciousness and for self-consciousness that
the Thing has its significance and distinguishes itself from being only a
thing.234 The Thing is in effect the work which is being interpreted by the
individual and is being imbued in its significance by uniting the factors
within the work: “individuality, actuality, doing, purpose, and the transition
into actuality . . . .”235
The Thing itself is the objective self-consciousness that itself has obtained
consciousness of its substance, which is an immediate consciousness in the
form of the simple universal essence.236 The Thing itself counts as the
essence and contains all the individual moments of the Thing of a particular
individual: the purpose, the means, the doing itself, and of the actuality.237
With regard to the individual, this person’s doing is analogous to the pure
doing, to actuality, and the Thing.238 The individual is concerned with the
Thing itself in the abstract, with the individual’s own doing, with the Thing
as the person’s own Thing, the Thing in general, and with enduring
actuality.239 However, one cannot approach a pure Thing alone since
others will come along and find in their consciousness they also approach a
Thing as their own Thing.240 When everyone approaches an individual’s
doing and expresses that individuality, others also find themselves in the
Thing, which broaches the Thing itself.241 Consciousness experiences both
the individual and the others in the Thing, and shows the Thing is an essence
existing as a doing of a single individual and of all individuals.242 The Thing

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 438.
HEGEL, supra note 11, at 163.
Id.
Id.
Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 438.
HEGEL, supra note 11, at 163–64.
Id. at 163–65.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 166–67.
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is the doing that is for others, and the doing of each and every one; the
Thing is “the essence which is the essence of all essences, the spiritual
essence.”243 The Thing itself is the substance permeated by individuality—
both as specific individuality and, equally, the individuality of all
individuals.244 The Thing itself is the universal existence as the doing of all
and each, and consciousness knows the Thing itself “as its own singular
actuality and as the actuality of all.”245
d.

Law Giving and Law Testing

After our understanding of the Thing itself as an ethical substance and its
consciousness as ethical consciousness,246 this Article must reconsider the
law of the heart, discussed above, in terms of law giving and law testing.
The ethical substance contains a difference of consciousness and divides
itself into the determinate laws of the absolute essence, and these laws are
immediately recognized without any justification or origin beyond the
essence as self-consciousness itself.247 Self-consciousness is a moment of
basic existence within the ethical substance allowing it to know the law and
the validity of the law immediately, and expresses “the law as follows: sound
reason knows immediately what is right and good.”248 From this, selfconsciousness can state, “[T]his is right and good,” and these are the
determinate laws.249 These laws arise immediately through ethical certainty
and are approached immediately in the same sense as sensory perception.250
In effect, our ethical intuition requires immediate consideration of that
intuition without any outside reflection.251
The law is an immediate thought of the absolute self-consciousness, thus,
ethical self-consciousness is one with the spiritual essence.252 Because the
law is universal, one cannot ask about its origin or validity as the act of asking
would put the self-consciousness above the universal and subject the
universal to individual insight.253 The self-consciousness is within the
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.
Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 439.
HEGEL, supra note 11, at 172.
Id. at 173.
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ethical substance, and the substance is the essence of self-consciousness that
is the actuality of the basic existence of the substance; therefore, it is
impossible to test or make laws because what is right is within the substance
itself.254
3.

Spirit as Ethical Substance and Essence of the Commonwealth

The Geist in the form of spirit as an ethical substance completes the Geist
as the “I that is We, and We that is I.”255 Hegel goes on to build from the
communal spirit further into areas of the ethical world, human and divine
law, ethical action, state of right, culture, enlightenment, freedom and terror,
and so on. For the purpose of understanding the Geist, I will not address
each of these topics because it is sufficient to focus only on the basic form
of the Geist as it has moved from being an individual consciousness to being
in the form of communal essence.
As an ethical substance in which everyone takes their share and does their
work, the Geist is dissolved essence.256 With this dissolution, the essence
gives self and soul to everyone, and the essence is actual and alive.257 Geist
is “consciousness in general,” and has the perception and sensory certainty
within itself, which allows it to understand itself and engage in self-analysis
and realize its own existence, as is the case in The Phenomenology of Spirit.258
With the Geist intuiting itself with reason as within itself, the Geist is reason,
truth, and actual ethical essence.259 The Geist is likewise the ethical life of
a people, as it goes through the various cultures, time, and shapes of the
world to attain self-knowledge.260 The Geist is realized in the multiplicity
of consciousness and is the essence of the commonwealth.261 “The
commonwealth is spirit which is for itself in that it maintains itself in the
counterglow of individuals,—and it is in itself or substance, in that it maintains

254. Id.
255. Id. at 76.
256. Id. at 174–75.
257. Id. at 175.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See id. (“Spirit must advance to the consciousness of what it immediately is, must sublate
the beautiful ethical life, and by way of a series of shapes attain to knowledge of itself. These shapes,
however, are differentiated from the previous ones by the fact that they are the real spirits, proper
actualities, and instead of shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of a world.” (footnote omitted)).
261. Id. at 177.
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them within itself. As the actual substance it is a people, and as actual consciousness
a citizen of that people.”262
4.

Religion and the Whole Spirit

From all the prior configurations of Geist, we reach religion and the
completion of Geist. Prior to religion, the Geist was in four configurations—
(Gestaltungen)263 of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and the
immediate spirit (Geist, which was not yet conscious of spirit)—that together
constituted the Geist in its basic worldly existence, while religion is the
totality of the four configurations or the absolute self.264 These four
configurations, plus religion, do not have a basic existence distinct from
each other and, hence, have no temporal existence apart from the completed
Geist.265 However, the configurations would distinguish themselves into
shapes, and these shapes continue to belong to the whole Geist and,
consequently, these shapes continue to be distinguished in time, but with
later shapes retaining their preceding forms.266 With the self-knowing Geist
complete, the shapes developed within the four configurations belong to the
Geist in general, and the determinate shape of religion selects the shape
corresponding to it.267 In this manner, religion corresponds its
development with the configurations of Geist.268
With the completed Geist, we can see all the configurations gathered
together as a single bundle, with each configuration shaped within the
Geist.269 All the configurations are contained in Geist and in each Geist, but
the configurations are the specific ways in which they are expressed and
262. Id.
263. There is a degree of inconsistency and ambiguity in the translation of Gestaltungen, with
Inwood using the word “configurations” for Gestaltungen and “shapes” for Gestalten, while the main text
from Hegel uses the word “moments” to reference Gestaltungen and “shapes” for Gestalten. Compare
Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 476 (“Worldly spirit involves all five ‘configurations’ (Gestaltungen)
considered so far, from consciousness in chapters I–III to spirit (in a narrower sense) in chapter VI,
not yet divided into ‘shapes’ (Gestalten) such as sensory certainty.”), with HEGEL, supra note 11, at 270
(“Only the whole spirit is in time, and the shapes, which are shapes of the whole spirit as such, present
themselves in a succession . . . . But the moments of this whole, consciousness, self-consciousness,
reason, and spirit, just because they are moments, have no Being-there different from one another.”).
264. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 270.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.; see Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 476 (stating Hegel corresponds the stages of
development of religion in a manner that parallels the development of the stages of spirit).
269. HEGEL, supra note 11, at 271.
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ways in which the Geist becomes aware of its configurations.270 The Geist,
complete and a world-spirit, becomes a self-conscious Geist; therefore,
religion makes it possible to know Geist before science can reveal it, but
science is nonetheless Geist’s true knowledge of itself.271 In the words of
Hegel’s translator, Michael Inwood: “Only at the end can we fully
understand the beginning, and why we began in that way.”272
VI. FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER
Unlike Hegel, Schleiermacher directly addressed the topics of
hermeneutics and is considered the “father”273 or “founder”274 of modern
hermeneutics. This section approaches Schleiermacher in two parts. First,
this section considers Schleiermacher’s early thoughts on hermeneutics as
expressed in his first manuscript, Manuscript 1: The Aphorisms of 1805 and
1809–10,275 and his second manuscript, Manuscript 2: The First Draft of 1809–
10.276 Second, this section approaches Schleiermacher’s later thoughts on
hermeneutics based on his speech to the academy, Manuscript 5: The Academy
addresses of 1829: On the Concept of Hermeneutics, with Reference to F.A. Wolf’s
Instructions and AST’s Textbooks,277 and based on Schleiermacher’s third, and
most important manuscript, Manuscript 3: Hermeneutics: The Compendium of
1819 and the Marginal Notes of 1828278 supplemented with his fourth
manuscript, Manuscript 4: The Separate Exposition of the Second Part (1826–
27);279 and his sixth manuscript, Manuscript 6: The Marginal Notes of 1832–
33.”280
A. The Early Manuscripts
Schleiermacher’s first two manuscripts cover the period from 1805 to
1810 and are predominantly concerned with rules of construction or
aphorisms. These manuscripts are pithy and provide convenient rules to
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Inwood Commentary, supra note 77, at 498.
273. Prasad, supra note 2, at 14.
274. James Duke, Translator’s Introduction, in F.D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTICS:
THE HANDWRITTEN MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 7, at 15.
275. SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 41–65.
276. Id. at 67–93.
277. Id. at 175–214.
278. Id. at 95–159.
279. Id. at 161–73.
280. Id. at 215–27.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

37

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3
783-852_VERTSMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

820

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

10/15/2022 1:22 PM

[Vol. 53:783

help with managing specific problems of understanding.281
In
Manuscript 1, Schleiermacher provides two maxims for understanding:
“(1) I am understanding everything until I encounter a contradiction or
nonsense. (2) I do not understand anything that I cannot perceive and
comprehend (construiren) as necessary.”282 These maxims were rephrased in
the second manuscript as: “Everything is understood when nothing
nonsensical remains. Nothing is understood that is not construed.”283
Based on these maxims, Schleiermacher provided over one hundred
aphorisms.284 Below is a sample of a few self-explanatory aphorisms from
Schleiermacher:
In reality, each word, even a particle, has only one meaning (Bedeutung), and
the various meanings of words must be understood by tracing them back to
their original unity. . . .285
....
On the value of definitions in language. The only true definitions are those
constructed from language’s own combined forms of derivation. . . .286
....
Every child comes to understand the meanings of words only through
hermeneutics. . . .287
....
One must already know a man in order to understand what he says, and yet
one first must become acquainted with him by what he says. . . .288
....
The understanding of a particular is always conditioned by an understanding
of the whole. . . .289
....
281. See id. at 41 (“Therefore, by making a special application of the universal rules,
hermeneutics may offer suggestions for the proper use of commentaries, but not for writing them.”).
282. Id. at 41.
283. Id. at 68.
284. Id. at 41–64.
285. Id. at 43.
286. Id. at 49.
287. Id. at 52.
288. Id. at 56.
289. Id. at 59.
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The whole is first understood as a genre. []New genres develop only from
larger spheres, and, in the final analysis, out of life itself.290

Some of Schleiermacher’s aphorisms are not self-explanatory and appear
to show ideas that Schleiermacher grasps more fully in the later manuscripts.
For example, Schleiermacher believes that several authors may be viewed as
a single school, and that changes within the school may serve for
clarification of confusing texts.291 This aphorism is stated in terms of
analyzing biblical texts since they are written by different authors, but this
aphorism may also be helpful in considering other texts, such as legal texts,
which are written by different authors with a shared goal or philosophy.
Another idea Schleiermacher brings up relates to the original basis for any
understanding: “The understanding of a given statement (Rede) is always
based on something prior, of two sorts—a preliminary knowledge of human
beings, a preliminary knowledge of the subject matter.”292 However,
Schleiermacher does not explain how the knowledge of human beings or of
subject matter originally arises. Finally, Schleiermacher provides an
aphorism directing the interpreter to combine the objective and subjective
elements “so that the interpreter can put himself ‘inside’ the author” and
understand the author better than the author understands himself.293 This
aphorism lays the groundwork for Schleiermacher’s later manuscripts and
the bifurcated approach requiring both grammatical and technical
interpretation.
The second manuscript provides some clarification on the nature of
hermeneutics, emphasizes the iterative process of understanding language,
and provides extra emphasis on the difference between general and special
hermeneutics. First, the nature of hermeneutics is the understanding of
texts, while the presentation of what is understood is a production text and
not hermeneutics.294 Second, Schleiermacher emphasizes the naming of an
object becomes definite through many experiences over time, and the inner
unity of an object can only be grasped by a “particular instance of the
290. Id. at 60.
291. Id. at 56.
292. Id. at 59.
293. Id. at 64.
294. Although a narrow meaning of hermeneutics is discussed here, a broader meaning is also
necessary in this Article predominantly because Gadamer’s use of “play” requiring texts be
“performed” for understanding. Id. at 68. This principle is repeated again in an aphorism at the
beginning of “The Compendium of 1819.” See id. at 96 (“To the contrary, [hermeneutics] presupposes
a familiarity with both the contents and the language of a text.”).
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intuition” which is never complete and has to be substituted by feeling.295
Third, Schleiermacher addressed the distinction between general and special
hermeneutics.296
Schleiermacher notes the Bible requires special
hermeneutics, but special hermeneutics can only be understood in terms of
general hermeneutics.297 Schleiermacher pushes this position further in The
Compendium of 1819 by begrudging that “there is no general hermeneutics as
the art of understanding but only a variety of specialized hermeneutics.”298
However, by 1833, Schleiermacher made explicit the only justification for
special hermeneutics that exists for the biblical interpretation is the
complexity of biblical language, and the only justification that exists for legal
hermeneutics is the need to look beyond authorial intent and towards
normative results.299 Nonetheless, Schleiermacher noted the great
similarity between special hermeneutics and general hermeneutics and
observed that general hermeneutics is likely to be sufficient for both legal
and biblical analysis.300
B. The Later Manuscripts
During this later period, Schleiermacher moved away from listing
aphorisms and towards developing a system of hermeneutics based on
grammatical and technical interpretation. For Schleiermacher, there were to
be no methods of interpretation other than his recursive approach of
grammatical and technical interpretation,301 yet Schleiermacher also
believed no rules can stipulate precisely how to undertake his recursive
approach.302 Schleiermacher believed grammatical and technical tasks of
interpretation are completely equal in importance,303 and neither task could
be executed without the other with each of the two tasks presupposing the
295. See id. at 76–77 (explaining the substitute for completeness cannot be another method rule,
but rather is “feeling [which] must be the substitute for completeness.”). Id. at 190 (“It is to be
overcome by feeling, by an immediate, sympathetic, and con-genial understanding. Hermeneutics is an
art and not a mechanical process.”).
296. Id. at 67.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 95.
299. Id. at 216.
300. See id. (“Even a special hermeneutics occasioned by both [biblical and legal] considerations
is still related to general hermeneutics in such a way that we could manage quite well with the general
alone.”).
301. Id. at 103.
302. Id. at 100 (“[I]t is necessary to move back and forth between grammatical and psychological
sides, and no rules can stipulate exactly how to do this.”).
303. Id. at 161.
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other.304 Nonetheless, in an ideal situation, understanding would be
achieved within each task in abstraction from the other task;305 however, in
reality one must move back and forth between the grammatical and
technical side since to complete the grammatical task in isolation, one would
need to have complete knowledge of the language, and to complete the
technical task in isolation, one would need complete knowledge of the
author.306 Likewise, it would be impossible to reconstruct the whole text
until the details are addressed.307
Schleiermacher takes the approach that, for significant texts,
misunderstandings occur as a matter of course and proper understandings
require will and effort by the interpreter.308 Furthermore, active
misunderstanding occurs when the interpreter’s own bias causes the
interpreter to read something into the text that prevents the author’s
meaning from emerging.309
Schleiermacher breaks down
misunderstandings into a matrix of qualitative versus quantitative and
objective versus subjective misunderstandings, with each misunderstanding
having the potential to give rise to other misunderstandings.310 These
misunderstandings are summarized as follows: (1) “[o]bjective qualitative
misunderstanding occurs when one part of speech in the language is
confused with another”; (2) “[s]ubjective qualitative misunderstanding
occurs when the reference of an expression is confused”; (3) subjective
quantitative misunderstanding is failing to see the potential value of a part
of speech or emphasis to which a speaker gives; (4) objective quantitative
misunderstanding is failing to see the degree of importance of the
speech.311 To avoid these misunderstandings, Schleiermacher looks to the
historical and divinatory, as well as the objective and subjective methods of
reconstruction of a given statement.312 These methods make up a matrix
of four methods, each needed to avoid misunderstandings: (1) objectivehistorical method analyzes a “statement in [its] relation to the language as a
whole” and considers the knowledge contained in the statement;
(2) objective-prophetic method considers how the statement develops the
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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language; (3) subjective-historical method considers how the statement
emerged from the author’s mind; and (4) subjective-prophetic method
recognizes how the thought in the statement will affect the author.313 The
task of understanding is infinite, since the author’s statement is passed into
the infinite future, leaving the specific question on how such a task is to be
undertaken to specialized hermeneutics.314
Returning to Schleiermacher’s basic paradigm of grammatical and
technical interpretation, we must give full consideration to both the
language and the thinking of the author:315
[E]ach person represents one locus where a given language takes shape in a
particular way, and his speech can be understood only in the context of the
totality of the language. But then too he is a person who is a constantly
developing spirit, and his speaking can be understood as only one moment in
this development in relation to all others.316

In effect, understanding must occur in terms of language since linguistic
heritage modifies the Geist; and, the act of speaking must be understood as
an author’s development because the individual is able to influence the
development of the language.317 For grammatical interpretation, the
determination of any point in the text is decided based on “the use of
language common to the author and his original [audience]”;318 hence, the
interpreter must “establish the same relationship between himself and the
author as existed between the author and his original audience.”319 The
interpreter needs to be familiar with “the sphere of life and relationships
between author” and his original audience320 to understand the discourse
in terms of language so that “[t]he person and his activity disappear and
seem to be merely an organ of the language.”321

313. Id. at 112.
314. Id. (emphasizing the importance of understanding an author's meaning when interpreting
text).
315. Id. at 98.
316. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 172–175 (discussing Hegel and Geist).
317. See SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 98–99 (“How grammatical and psychological
interpretation are related to dialectical and rhetorical thinking. Each makes use of the other.
Grammatical and psychological remain the main divisions.”).
318. Id. at 117.
319. Id. at 216.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 161.
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The second canon of grammatical interpretation defines each word in the
text based on its context.322 Grammatical interpretation is aimed at a
particular language as a whole rather than as aggregation of discrete units.323
Therefore, the text makes up the general view (Aneschauung) of grammatical
interpretation compared to the general view of the author’s total literary
output in the case of technical interpretation.324 Admittedly, the general
view gives rise to the hermeneutic circle because joining together partial
views, understood in terms of the general unity of the text, is the only way
to gain the general view.325
Technical interpretation is the understanding of human thought in terms
of shared humanity.326 “The language and its determining power disappear
and seem to be merely an organ of the person, in the service of his
individuality, just as in grammatical interpretation the personality is in the
service of the language.”327 Through technical interpretation, the
interpreter discovers the individuality of the author,328 learns everything
about the author that caused the author to write the text,329 and recognizes
with definiteness how the author’s individuality is expressed.330 Technical
interpretation looks at “the possible ways of combining and expressing
thoughts—not as general concepts, as logical laws, or as an empirical
aggregate, but as a function of the nature of the individual person.”331
Schleiermacher notes at times a class or school may represent individual
authors without distinct individuality or authors with no individuality or
style at all, grouping them together as a whole based on type.332 Somewhat
contradictorily, Schleiermacher also states that individuality comes from
subject matter or artistic form more than from within the author and some
authors manifest “mannerisms” that are contrary to their own character and
are not indicative of an author’s individuality or style.333
322. Id. at 127 (comparing the first canon serving “only to exclude certain possibilities” against
the second cannon, which “seems to be determinative”).
323. Id. at 162 (describing the workings of grammatical interpretation).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 161.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 162.
329. Id. at 147–48.
330. Id. at 162 (describing, like grammatical interpretation, technical interpretation “is divided
into two contrasting tasks”).
331. Id. at 162–63.
332. Id. at 165–66.
333. Id. at 165.
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There are two general methods of technical interpretation: divinatory and
comparative.334 The divinatory method requires the interpreter to
transform himself into the author and attain “an immediate comprehension
of the author as an individual.”335 The comparative approach requires
considering the work in itself then breaking up the whole of the work and
typecasting the author;336 this approach is most appropriate for elements
that clearly show an author’s individuality.337 The divinatory and
comparative approaches require the interpreter to understand the
vocabulary and history of the time period in which the author lived and
require multiple readings.338
Finally, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic circle requires special attention
because it is logically circular; the part and the whole are only understood
together; and it is inherently difficulty to independently understand and
resolve this hermeneutic circle.339 Schleiermacher provides a couple
approaches for resolving the hermeneutic circle in his third and fourth
manuscripts. In his third manuscript, Schleiermacher provides this
algorithm:
(a) Begin with a general overview of the text. (b) Comprehend it by moving
in both directions simultaneously. (c) Only when the two coincide for one
passage does one proceed to another passage. (d) When the two do not agree,
it is necessary to go back until the error in calculation is found.340

Schleiermacher’s fourth manuscript added nuance to his methods. The
algorithm becomes a two-step process analogous to what he described in
terms of divinatory and comparative methodology: “The unity of the whole
is grasped and then seen in its relation to the various sections within the
whole. The first task shows the author’s idea to be the basis for the
composition. The latter task shows his actual way of grasping and
presenting it.”341 Schleiermacher distinguishes the unity from the purpose
of the work, explaining the unity can be found when comparing a work’s

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 116 n.13.
Id. at 168.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss3/3

44

Vertsman: Hermeneutics for Legal Research and Analysis
783-852_VERTSMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

HERMENEUTICS FOR LEGAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

10/15/2022 1:22 PM

827

true beginning and end to bind the whole work.342 Schleiermacher gives
such an example; through erroneous interpretation of biblical books, the
ending of the Book of John may serve as the ending to the whole Bible
rather than as a conclusion to an individual section.343 The second task
involves understanding the individuality of the work through “immediate
intuition (Anschauung) and comparison with other works.”344 Both intuition
and comparison are necessary because “[i]mmediate intuition cannot be
communicated[,]”345 and pure comparison is unable to penetrate true
individuality.346
This section provides a summary of the core theories of hermeneutics
presented by Schleiermacher in his manuscripts, and, to the extent that some
of these theories still appear unsatisfactory, we can find solace in
Schleiermacher’s self-reflection on his own search for hermeneutic theories.
Towards the end of his career, Schleiermacher himself admitted that after
his long search for the best methodology of interpretation, he was
confronted with the reality that his search was in vain and resulted only in
numerous discrete rules of interpretation, many of which were ambiguous
and lacked satisfactory organization.347 Overall, despite Schleiermacher’s
harsh self-criticism, Schleiermacher has moved his analysis beyond
aphorisms and into a system of interpretation, and much of his approach
continues to be utilized and defended for interpretation of texts in
contemporary times.
VII. EMILIO BETTI
Moving forward more than a century beyond Hegel and Schleiermacher,
I now turn to Emilio Betti who continues to stand as one of the
cornerstones of modern hermeneutics.348 Betti was an Italian jurist with a
focus on procedure and international-comparative law.349 In 1954, Betti
presented his thoughts in the Hermeneutisches Manifest and in Zur Grundlegung

342. Id.
343. Id. at 169.
344. Id. at 171.
345. Id.; cf. supra text accompanying notes 160–170 (exploring Hegel’s criticism of arguments
based on common sense, genius, or feeling).
346. SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 7, at 171.
347. Id. at 176.
348. Vinx, supra note 65, at ix.
349. Id.
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einer allgemeinen Auslegungslehre.350 In 1955, Betti’s masterpiece work on
hermeneutics was published in two volumes in Italy under the name Teoria
Generale della Interpretazione.351 Unfortunately, Betti’s work did not receive
much attention in Germany, motivating Betti to write a more succinct
version of his views in Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der
Geisteswissenschaften zugleich ein Beitrag zumi Unterschied zwichen Auslegung und
Sinngebung, published in Germany two years after Gadamer’s publication of
Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method).352 For a review of Betti’s
theories, I will be relying on a 2021 English translation of the second edition
(1972 edition) of the Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der
Geisteswissenschaften353 or, in English, “Hermeneutics as a General
Methodology of the Sciences of the Spirit.”354
A. Theory and Canons of Construction
For Betti, interpretation is a triadic process of achieving understanding
involving the mediation of two extremes: the interpreter, who is a living
spirit, and the objectified spirit, which exists in the representative form.355
The mediation is the process where the objectified spirit shows itself to the
interpreter as “irremovable objectivity.”356 “To understand is, then, a recognition and a re-construction of a meaning and with the meaning a
recognizable spirit through the representative forms of its objectifications
and that speaks to the learning spirit, which feels itself similar to it in the
commonality of human nature.”357 This process requires the interpreter to
reproduce the thought of the author and to make it his own, while still
maintaining the interpreter’s thought as being objective and something
other than the thought of the interpreter.358 This maintenance of
objectivity is difficult since it demands genuine subordination by the

350. Georgio A. Pinton, Editorial Preface, EMILIO BETTI, HERMENEUTICS AS A GENERAL
METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT xxvi (Mariano Croce & Marco Goldoni eds.,
Routledge 2021) (1962).
351. BETTI, supra note 8, at xxvi.
352. Pinton, supra note 350, at xxvi.
353. Id.
354. BETTI, supra note 8, at 1.
355. Id. at 9–10 (“It is always a question of an exigency that solicits the spiritual spontaneity of
one person that is called upon to understand . . . .”).
356. Id. at 10.
357. Id. at 11.
358. Vinx, supra note 65, at xii-xiii.
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interpreter.359 Correct understanding happens when the process in the
mind of the interpreter constitutes the exact reversal of the creative process
of the author.360 Consequently, the meanings conveyed by the author are
objective facts, and the interpreter’s only goal is to capture these meanings
rather than to either judge or learn.361 From this worldview, Betti provides
four fundamental canons of hermeneutics: autonomy of object, totality of
interpretation, actuality of understanding, and adequacy of meaning.362
The canon of hermeneutic autonomy of the object is a canon of
“immediate evidence”; namely, the objects of interpretation are
objectifications of spirituality and, therefore, must be understood in terms
of the spirit which is objectified within these objects.363 Betti explicates
that these objects are not to be understood in terms of a spirit or thought
of an agent other than the author; rather, they must be “understood in their
autonomy, in the way of their own law of formation, in the context into
which they will be involved, and according to their inner necessity,
coherence, and rationality.”364 Betti vehemently opposes any denial of
objectivity, including attribution of meaning based on the initial situation of
the text or a pre-understanding within hermeneutics.365 The canon of
autonomy of object requires that the interpreter must come to the text with
the presupposition that the texts will provide information which is not yet
known and exists independently from the interpreter’s attribution of
meaning.366 In this manner, inferring meaning into texts and violating the
canon of autonomy of object puts the objectivity of all humanities in
doubt.367
Betti’s second canon is the canon of coherence of meaning,368 which
draws upon Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic circle and its focus on the
reciprocity between the individual elements of the work and the whole of
the work.369 In that vein, Betti likewise believes in Schleiermacher’s focus

359. BETTI, supra note 8, at 12.
360. Vinx, supra note 65, at xii.
361. Id. at xii–xiii.
362. Id. at xiii–xv.
363. BETTI, supra note 8, at 14.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 40.
366. Id.
367. See id. at 41 (highlighting the fundamental dangers of pre-understandings).
368. Larx Vinx refers to this canon as the “canon of totality” since the whole and the parts
inform each other and stand in reflective equilibrium. Vinx, supra note 65, at xiii.
369. BETTI, supra note 8, at 16.
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on an author’s entire life as an influencer of each of the author’s individual
works and with each such work influencing other works and comprising the
author’s life and personality.370 However, the “totality” can only be
understood by reference to the cultural system within which the work is
interpreted because the interpreter’s cultural system acts to limit meanings
to those works which are of a similar kind and content.371 Consequently,
there will still be some preliminary understanding at the initial level that will
progressively be consolidated and enriched towards an understanding.372
Betti’s third canon is the canon of actuality of understanding, which
involves the interpreter relating the work to their own experiential
background to reason with the ideas of the text, and to understand the writer
in terms of the writer’s motivations as a form of “sympathetic
understanding”.373 The interpreter must reverse the author’s process of
writing and reconstruct within the interpreter the thoughts of the author.374
The interpreter should take a memory or personal experience of the author
and absorb it as the interpreter’s own experience in order to meet a “spiritual
horizon” where the work is reconstructed.375 The nature of this process
reasons that it is impossible to completely free interpretation from
subjectivity.376 Nonetheless, objectivity can be maintained despite this type
of objectivity that exists in humanities being different from the type of
objectivity within the hard sciences.377
The fourth and final canon is the canon of hermeneutical correspondence
of meaning.378 “According to this canon, the interpreter should strive to
bring its own lively actuality into the closest adhesion and harmony with the
message that it receives from the object in such consonant way that the one
and the other resonate in harmony and perfect unison.”379 In this canon,
the interpreter invokes an “ethical and reflective human spirit” in the form
of being unselfish and self-effacing by decisively overcoming the
interpreter’s personal prejudices and approaching the object of

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. (extrapolating on the ultimate results of achieving preliminary understanding).
Vinx, supra note 65, at xiv.
BETTI, supra note 8, at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 62.
Id.
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interpretation with a “congenial attitude animated by sentiment of strict
affinity.”380
B. Betti-Gadamer Debate
Betti promotes adherence to his four canons of construction, arguing the
ultimate context to interpretation “is the totality of the life” and mind of the
author.381 Betti’s approach seeks to maintain hermeneutic autonomy of the
object, but provides an inadequate solution to the problem of judicial
hermeneutics which, according to Hobbes, requires more than sympathetic
reading, but rather the application of laws which “reads in” the legislative
intent that the laws are just and are consistent with the laws of nature.382
Another argument for historic hermeneutics being a separate hermeneutics
is that law requires special hermeneutics, since law must be interpreted in a
way that engages the interpreter’s convictions in order for law to serve its
normative purpose, while this would not apply for historic hermeneutics,
where the interpreter is simply attempting to understand an accurate picture
of the past.383 This contrast between the judicial hermeneutics as the only
appropriate hermeneutics versus judicial hermeneutics as a form of special
hermeneutics rests at the core of Betti’s and Gadamer’s disagreements.384
In criticizing Gadamer, Betti focuses on three arguments: first, Betti
criticizes Gadamer for justifying his hermeneutics by simply stating that it is
descriptively accurate of what actually happens; second, Betti criticizes
Gadamer for attempting to separate true and false prejudices; and third,
Betti criticizes Gadamer’s approach to the hermeneutic circle. The first
criticism is very direct, with Betti citing Kant to argue that the
epistemological problem is one of justification rather than an explanation of
“what actually happens.”385 Betti also published correspondence from
Gadamer where Gadamer explains that no one can ever be entirely free
from prejudice, and even if the inability to put aside one’s prejudice is a
defect, one should consider why this defect is unavoidable and focus on
“what is” rather than “what ought to be or could be.”386

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id.
Vinx, supra note 65, at xiv–xv.
Id. at xv.
Id. at xvi.
Id.
BETTI, supra note 8, at 61.
Id. at 62 n.4.
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Betti’s second argument criticizes Gadamer’s distinction between true
and false prejudices, with particular criticism directed at the “foreconception of completeness of the object.”387 Gadamer believes that the
prejudice of completeness implies “that a text should completely express its
meaning—but also that what it says should be the complete truth.”388
According to Gadamer, this expectation is necessary for any understanding
to happen at all, since “[t]o disagree with a source or to question the truth
of some of her claims is possible only against a background of far-reaching
implicit agreement.”389 For Betti, this is a form of “auto-deception” that
prevents trustworthy or valid results.390 In effect, Gadamer’s interpretation
violates the autonomy of the interpretive object and it is impossible to
obtain any type of detached understanding. With Gadamer’s approach to
interpretation, there is a conflation between deriving and imposing
meanings; therefore, it becomes impossible to obtain any results that would
allow for the humanities to be regarded as a science.391 Betti, on the other
hand, believes that understanding can only be correct when the interpreter
succeeds in recreating the thought that the author was trying to convey in
the object.392
Finally, Betti criticizes Gadamer’s conception of the hermeneutic circle
as being based on the interpreter’s beliefs rather than on the canon of totality
and the relationship of the parts and the whole of the object.393 According
to Betti, Gadamer gives the interpreter the acquired possession of the object
of interpretation, at least as a form of checking this object.394 By contrast,
Betti requires that the interpreter limits himself to being receptive to the
alien opinions which are incorporated in a text and letting the text speak.395
VIII. GADAMER
Gadamer’s hermeneutics does not conflict with the strict methodology of
science but rather behaves as a new and creative method which mediates
between philosophy and science.396 Gadamer traces hermeneutics from
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 48.
Vinx, supra note 65, at xvii.
Id.
BETTI, supra note 8, at 48.
Vinx, supra note 65, at xix–xx.
Id. at xxi.
Id. at xvii.
BETTI, supra note 8, at 52.
Id.
GADAMER, supra note 9, at 555–56.
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the nineteenth century and advocates for hermeneutics as the basis of all
humanities, freeing hermeneutics from its prior role of being only related in
supporting theology and philology.397
In this metamorphosis,
hermeneutics went beyond its initial purpose of facilitating understanding
of difficult texts.398 Rather, hermeneutics became the unlocking and
mediating spirit for “everything that is no longer immediately situated in a
world—that is, all tradition, whether art or the other spiritual creations of
the past: law, religion, philosophy, and so forth . . . .”399
In Truth and Method, Gadamer criticizes romantic hermeneutics and looks
towards inspiration from Hegel and Heidegger for a more realistic
approach.400 In developing his new approach to hermeneutics, Gadamer
outlines concepts such as Bildung, play, and symbols, and then explains how
the hermeneutic experience achieves understanding and provides the
epistemological justification for knowledge.401
A. Criticism of Romantic Hermeneutics
Although Gadamer recognized Schleiermacher for pioneering
hermeneutics as an independent method, he also strongly criticized the
logical flaws within Schleiermacher’s approach to textual interpretation.402
The most devastating attack concerns Schleiermacher’s attempt to
reconstruct the original circumstances which gave rise to the original
text.403 In Gadamer’s words: “Reconstructing the original circumstances,
like all restoration, is a futile undertaking in view of the historicity of our
being. What is reconstructed, a life brought back from the lost past, is not
the original. In its continuance in an estranged state it acquires only a
derivative, cultural existence.”404 Gadamer presents this historicity as
simply trying to conserve dead meaning, analogous to taking works of art
from museums and putting them in places originally intended—this ritual
397. Id. at 157.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. See id. at 161 (discussing the fundamental superiority of Hegel’s hermeneutic idea of
“thoughtful mediation with contemporary life” over Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics based on historical
reconstruction).
401. See generally id. (describing Gadamer’s approach and the concepts used to inform its
development).
402. Id. at 179.
403. Id. at 159–60. For a thorough discussion on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, see supra
Part VI.
404. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 159.
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does not re-create what those objects were originally, but rather reduces
them to simple tourist attractions.405 To further advance his point,
Gadamer references a passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which
explains the works are like fruits presented by someone who has already
picked them, these fruits do not possess their real life or the elements that
brought them into existence.406 In the words of Hegel,
“the spirit of the fate that present those works of art to us is more than
the ethical life and actuality of that people, for it is the re-collection of
the spirit that in them was still externalized—it is the spirit of the tragic
fate that gathers all those individual gods and attributes of the substance
into the single pantheon, into spirit conscious of itself as spirit.”407
According to Gadamer, the above passage shows that Hegel points to an
entire dimension of understanding which goes beyond Schleiermacher: the
understanding of the text by the self-consciousness “in a higher way” as
absolute knowledge.408 In that vein, hermeneutics is carried out by the selfpenetrating spirit as a counter-position to the historical consciousness,
which is replaced with a thinking relation to the past which is not restoration
of the past but a mediation of the past with contemporary life.409
Gadamer goes on to address the issue of epistemology, which arose in
the humanities after empirical research effectively discredited the Hegelian
system.410 Going back to Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Schleiermacher’s
biographer, sought epistemological justification by making the method of
knowledge in the humanities appear similar to the methodology of natural
sciences.411 Dilthey focused on the concept of “results” and, with romantic
hermeneutics, he framed the object of understanding as the deciphering of
a text and the understanding of meaning.412 In this way, for romantic
hermeneutics, the text takes the form of a “Thou,” and the meaning of the
text is the “encounter of the spirit with itself.”413 The text itself is both
familiar enough to be intelligible and strange enough to require
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 297 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id.
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hermeneutics to understand it.414 Romantic hermeneutics takes the “IThou” relationship between the text and the interpreter from
Schleiermacher’s approach that texts are able to be understood in the same
way as another person.415 Therefore, the author’s meaning can also be
divined from the original text by placing the interpreter in a position where
he is contemporaneous with the author of the text.416 The apparent
methodological nature of Dilthey’s approach—as inspired by
Schleiermacher—creates an illusion of equating hermeneutics with natural
science with the hermeneutic researcher examining the evidence in the form
of a text in the same way as a natural scientist examines natural
phenomenon.417
Gadamer criticizes the Schleiermacher approach directly and effectively
reduces the claim of methodological and objective practice of exegesis into
a contradiction. Among the criticisms presented by Gadamer: the
psychological understanding within the hermeneutic circle “is a logically
circular argument”;418 interpreting the parts in terms of the whole was
expanded in the eighteenth century to include the “totality of the historical
reality to which each individual historical document belonged”;419 the
concept of “original reader” is a crude limitation on the horizon of a text’s
meaning;420 and Schleiermacher’s implied belief that, although individuality
could never be fully understood, this understanding could be approximated
through “feeling, by an immediate, sympathetic, and congenial
understanding.”421
Gadamer’s criticism of “methodologism” expands further to criticism of
twentieth century contemporaries such as Betti for their persistent focus on
various rules and the applications of those rules at the expense of grasping
the fundamental structure necessary for all understanding.422 Betti and
others, in turn, have claimed that Gadamer’s hermeneutics weakens
scientific objectivity423 because Gadamer, by focusing on phenomenology,
is reducing hermeneutics to a question of fact rather than a question of
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (summarizing the analogous relationship presented by Dlithey).
Id. at 189.
Id. at 177–78.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
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principle.424 Gadamer explains that his starting point is with the way things
are—not with the way things ought to be or could be.425 Additionally,
Gadamer’s method goes beyond the concept of methodology held in
science and towards an approach which explains how understanding of
information always occurs; furthermore, conceiving of hermeneutics
entirely as a problem of method is in itself regarding knowledge as entirely
subjective.426
B. Bildung, Play, and Symbols
Much of our vocabulary relating to common words such as “play” or
“symbol” are taken for granted, but these words have a great deal of
philosophy and history attached to them.427 The following discussion of
the key concepts of Bildung, play, and symbols is meant to provide a brief
foundation for the nature of words and the process phenomenology of
understanding, which will be addressed more fully later.
1.

Bildung

Gadamer starts with a review and an update of the concept of Bildung,
which he borrows from Hegel.428 Although the common use of the word
Bildung in German means culture as in “developing one’s capacities or
talents[,]” this word “evokes the ancient mystical tradition according to
which man carries in his soul the image of God, after whom he is fashioned,
and which man must cultivate in himself.”429 The Latin equivalent word
for Bildung is formatio, which has related words in English—form and
formation—and German—formierung and formation.430 However, these
words “lack . . . the mysterious ambiguity of Bild, which comprehends both
Nachbild (image, copy) and Vorbild (model).”431 Gadamer describes original
usage of Bildung as being different from its modern meaning in German
because original Bildung does not have a goal at the end of some type of
formation.432 Bildung, as used by Gadamer, refers to a continual Bildung
424. Id. at 513.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 9.
428. Id. at 11.
429. Id. at 10.
430. Id.
431. Id. (emphasis added). The difference and role of model and copy will be analyzed further.
Infra Part VIII.b.iii.
432. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 10.
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with no goals other than Bildung itself, so that whatever is formed belongs
entirely to one’s self and the means of forming is never lost.433
Hegel demonstrated that the independent existence of work gives the
working consciousness self-awareness and contains all the elements that
make up “practical Bildung,” which is “the distancing from the immediacy of
desire . . . and the exacting demand of a universal.”434 Practical Bildung is
the whole fulfillment of one’s profession and “theoretical Bildung” is going
beyond one’s knowledge and experience and towards the universal
viewpoints so as to become spiritual with the culture of the people which,
in turn, the individual makes his own.435 In this manner, Bildung is a part
of Geist but it is not tied to Hegel’s philosophy of the absolute Geist.436
Bildung is in effect the already-formed scholarly consciousness in which
exists the movement of judgment and knowledge of the humanities.437 An
example of this Bildung is demonstrated by the faculty of memory, which is
not conceived as a simple talent.438 Rather, memory provides a mind with
“special free mobility” and is itself a part of Bildung—through the act of
forgetting, memory allows for renewal, reevaluation, and “the capacity to
see everything with fresh eyes, so that what is long familiar fuses with new
into a many leveled unity.”439 Through Bildung a cultivated consciousness
can be developed in an omnidirectional universal sense which exceeds all of
the sense in the natural sciences.440 This universal sense and common sense
based in the tradition of Bildung is more suitable as a paradigm to understand
the humanities as a science than through the scientific method.441
2.

Play

Although every interpretation is a re-creation, the concept of play is what
preserves the original work instead of creating recursive interpretations of a
work to the point that the original work is completely lost.442 As Gadamer
433. Id.
434. Id. at 12.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 13. Gadamer attempts to separate Bildung from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit;
however, this does not appear very persuasive when looking at Hegel’s explanation of Geist and the
related concept of Bildung. Supra Part V.
437. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 13–14.
438. Id. at 14.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 16.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 118.
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explains: “[P]lay itself is a transformation of such a kind that the identity of
the player does not continue to exist for anybody. Everybody asks instead
what is supposed to be represented, what is ‘meant.’ The players (or
playwright) no longer exist, only what they are playing.”443 Play, same as
language, goes beyond the mind or subjectivity of the speaker—it is
phenomenological.444 Play is fulfilled through the player taking the play
seriously and losing himself in the play with the players themselves not being
the subject of the play, but rather being the mode by which the play is
presented.445 Through play, the interpretation is a representation of the
meaning that the interpreter found in the work, rather than a re-creation of
the creative act of the work, which avoids the issue of recursively
reinterpreting the original work.446 This is to contrast with an
interpretation that changes the meaning of the original, which includes
presentations that attempt to re-create historical authenticity: for example,
by playing historical music on historical instruments.447
In his discussion of play, Gadamer is taking a passing shot at
Schleiermacher’s historicism and referencing Hegel’s “fruit plucked from a
tree” phenomenon discussed previously. Gadamer further connects play to
interpretation. He emphasizes mediation is not differentiated from the
work, suggesting the experience is the experience of the work, rather than
the experience of the interpretation.448 Consequently, works that stretch
across long time periods are not merely part of the historical consciousness;
rather, these works continue to fulfill their purpose in every age of their
existence, even if they are merely located in a museum.449 These works do
not lose the basis of their original purpose which allows them to be
reconstructed to the past, but their existence, even in a museum next to
other works of art, still maintain their own origin and purpose as an integral
part of themselves.450

443. Id. at 111.
444. See id. (“Thus transformation into structure means that what existed previously exists no
longer. But also that what now exists, what represents itself in the play of art, is the lasting and true.”).
445. Id. at 103.
446. Id. at 118.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 119.
450. Id.
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Symbols

Gadamer follows a path from symbol and allegory towards the artistic
concepts of copy, image and picture, then returns to texts that are also
interpreted as experiences of art.451 The concept of symbol relates to
metaphysics and the idea of some spiritual spark that exists beyond the
visible world that underlies religious worship.452
The symbolic
representation and the symbolic function of language through metaphors is
a part of Kantian thought, which can be summarized as: “Everything that
happens is a symbol, and, in fully representing itself, it points towards
everything else.”453 The essence of a symbol is that what is presented is
substituted and the meaning exists within the symbol itself.454 The
opposite of a symbol is a sign which signifies pure substitution: a sign is
supposed to indicate a concept or idea outside itself such as the case of a
traffic sign and not direct any attention to itself outside of being a simple
pointer.455
To build on the concept of symbol, Gadamer takes a detour into the
understanding of the “truth of art,” which he also considers a part of
hermeneutics.456 Since understanding art requires an experience and
encounter with the art itself, it is an understanding that is outside what can
be understood through the scientific method.457 Art can be understood in
terms of aesthetic differentiation, where the work and the artist transcend
their place in the world and what remains is a “pure work of art” that
belongs to aesthetic consciousness.458 Aesthetic differentiation is an
abstraction from the original content in the picture:459 a work of art, such
as a statue, which may include a commemoration of an event such as a peace
treaty or a battle, goes beyond simply recalling a well-known event, but
rather adds something new of its own.460 From this understanding of art,
we need to understand how art and symbols relate to each other to abstract
them to the understanding of texts.

451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id. at 157.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 66 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 145.
Id. at 145–46.
Id. at 87.
Id.
See id. at 74.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 143.
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In terms of art, it is helpful to distinguish between a picture, a copy, and
an image. Gadamer uses the definition of a “picture” from the artistic ideal
of the Renaissance, which regards a picture as a unified and closed structure
where nothing can be taken from it and nothing added without its
destruction.461 The purpose of this definition of picture, which is related
to philosophical aesthetics, is to draw a comparison to a copy and an
image.462 In essence, a picture maintains an existence on its own and does
not directly imitate the original in terms of the source material; for example,
a play based on world events does not re-create those events, but has its
own existence and presents an appearance of the world events.463 In this
way, a picture is between a sign and a symbol since the picture does more
than simply point to something else.464 Opposite of a picture is a “copy,”
which is supposed to merely point to the original and resemble the original
as closely as possible.465 Finally, an ideal copy would actually not be a copy,
but rather an “image” like a reflection in the mirror, since this reflection
would not have any existence at all outside of the original.466 The mirror
image preserves both unity and non-differentiation because the image is not
a copy: the image is connected and inseparable to the original.467
To further explain the nature of a picture and to argue against historicism
in hermeneutics, Gadamer turns to the example of a “genre picture or a
figure composition.”468 Unlike in portraits, in a genre picture it would be
considered a defect and break immersion if an observer recognized an
artist’s typical model who was used in the production of the picture.469 This
is because the model that is recognized in the picture is “untransformed
material,” which was supposed to lose its original appearance and schema
and become integrated into the picture by the artist.470 Likewise, for works
of literature, interpreting those works in terms of the biographies of the
authors or historical sources is analogous to interpreting paintings on the
basis of an artist’s models.471 This type of interpretation in effect fails to
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id. at 131.
Id. at 132–33.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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accept the work’s claim to meaning and interrogates it as a historical
document, looking to contextualize the work in terms of the age of its
production.472 Although in some instances this context may be related to
the work’s specific allusions and claims to meanings, typically this type of
historical and background information would not be visible to typical
modern observers and would not be important for the meaning of the work
as a whole.473
The remaining topics of copy and the dialectic of image are later
connected to writings in the manner of words and language. Language
behaves in a manner that goes beyond being a sign and more towards a copy
or image with words in a language having some relationship to what they
are imaging.474 This relates to the theory of language and the role of words
and how experience finds words to express itself.475 This in turn leads to
theological discussions on comparing the divine Word to human words,
which are formed as an incomplete image of God’s Word.476 Although
these theological topics are beyond the scope of this Article, these
discussions provide a perspective on our understanding of language.
Moving further into literature, Gadamer draws a parallel between the
actualization of a work of art occurring in play (the point where audience
sees the art when it is actualized) and the actualization of texts occurring in
the process of understanding, which transforms those texts into living
meaning.477 “Reading with understanding is always a kind of reproduction,
performance, and interpretation. Emphasis, rhythmic ordering, and the like
are part of wholly silent reading too. Meaning and the understanding of it
are so closely connected with the corporeality of language that
understanding always involves an inner speaking as well.”478 Works of
literature pass between different locations and time periods, and interpreting
these works involves a process of reading where a dead text is transformed
into contemporary familiarity.479 This contemporary familiarity is unique
for writings since, unlike architecture or other physical records of the past,

472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
See id. at 419–23 (discussing the intersection of human words and theological words).
Id. at 156–57.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 156.
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writings retain their originality and can expose the reader to thoughts across
time and location.480
C. The Hermeneutic Experience
The hermeneutic experience for Gadamer involves prejudices of the
interpreter and a different conception of the hermeneutic circle: a
hermeneutic circle that is resolved through a meeting of the horizons (or
prejudices) between the interpreter and the author.481 From this
framework, Gadamer uses the example of legal hermeneutics482 and the
common experience of language483 to approach the fundamental
hermeneutic problem of method.
1.

Prejudice and the Hermeneutic Circle

The concept of prejudice, as borrowed from Heidegger and used by
Gadamer, is free of the negative connotations that were acquired by this
word during the Enlightenment; instead, for Gadamer, prejudice means a
provisional expectation before a final decision can be reached.484 This type
of prejudice or pre-conception should still avoid arbitrary biases or
habits.485 An interpreter must be sensitive to a text’s otherness without
equating it to neutrality, but rather the interpreter must put personal
prejudices and pre-conceptions to the foreground and allow the text to
present its otherness against an interpreter’s foreground of prejudices.486
This phenomenological description of interpretation comes from
Heidegger and is in effect what happens when a reader is “reading what is
there.”487 By contrast, Schleiermacher relied on the hermeneutic circle,
which required that the background of the text must be used to understand
the text on its own terms and the partiality of the interpreter and over
hastiness would cause errors in understanding.488 Schleiermacher’s
approach can be refuted with Hegel’s example of “classical,” which are self-

480. Id.
481. See id. at 304–06 (discussing how the fusion of various horizons plays a vital role in
understanding).
482. Id. at 518.
483. See id. at 436–84 (discussing “language as the medium of hermeneutic experience”).
484. Id. at 273.
485. Id. at 269.
486. Id. at 271–72.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 279–80.
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significant and self-interpretive489 works in that they “speak[] in such a way
that it is not a statement about what is past—documentary evidence that
still needs to be interpreted—rather, it says something to the present as if it
were said specifically to it.”490 Consequently, understanding, which is
validated by hermeneutics, is the participation in tradition and the constant
mediation between the past and present.491
The process of understanding adds a new dimension, with the interpreter
being incorporated into the object of interpretation.492 In order to
understand a text, an interpreter must project his own understanding onto
to a text to create meaning from the text—in this way, all understanding is
a form of self-understanding.493 This is because understanding involves
not only understanding the explicit meaning of a text but also the hidden
meanings and “knowing one’s way around” the text.494 Because traditional
hermeneutics fails to acknowledge the projective role of the interpreter;
traditional hermeneutics operates with an overly narrow horizon of
understanding.495 Projection by an interpreter starts as soon as any initial
meaning emerges from a text and continues with the interpreter
continuously revising his “fore-projection” until the meaning is penetrated
and understanding of the text is achieved through recursive substitutions of
prior fore-projections with progressively more suitable fore-projections.496
These fore-projections are not to be reduced to circle, but rather to achieve
a fundamental type of knowing while “never . . . allow[ing] our fore-having,
fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out
these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.”497
Gadamer traces the concept of the hermeneutic circle to ancient rhetoric
and the desire to “understand meaning centrifugally,”498 however,
Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle is not formal, objective, or subjective; rather
it presents the interaction between the textual tradition and the interpreter
489. Id. at 290.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 291.
492. Id. at 254; see also supra Part V (discussing Hegel’s Geist in the form of reason and the role
of individuals attempting to take possession of a work which has been reduced to actuality).
493. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 251.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 269.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 291.
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which is a matter of common tradition.499 Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle
differs from Schleiermacher’s attempt at divination of authorial
intention.500 Instead, Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle attempts to merge the
temporal horizons of understanding—not as a method but rather as an
existence of understanding.501 Through the basic commonality between
the author and the interpreter, some fundamental enabling prejudices, which
are not at the disposal of either the author or the interpreter, must be
achieved in order to start the hermeneutic process—these basic prejudices
come from the common language or tradition of the text.502
Through temporal distance, the meanings contained in a text go beyond
the author and the interpretation; this is not a matter of reproduction of
meaning, but is instead a productive activity.503 Therefore, the interpreter
does not understand the text better than the author; the interpreter
understands it in a different way.504 This new understanding breaks
through the hermeneutic circle, since the text is understood through its own
claim to truth rather than as an expression of a state of being.505 Temporal
distance allows textual content to be exposed with the fading of the
circumstances leading to the creation of the text.506 Consequently,
temporal distance is a means of understanding, not a barrier that must be
overcome through historicism.507 The horizon of understanding is
“everything which can be seen from a particular vantage point” and is
constituted by the relevant prejudices or fore-understanding.508 Therefore,
to approach and understand the hermeneutic problem, one must first obtain
the proper horizon for the encounter with the text.509

499. Id. at 293; see also supra Part V (discussing Hegel’s Geist in the form of Commonwealth and
society as a whole).
500. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 293 (“This view of understanding came to its logical
culmination in Schleiermacher’s theory of the divinatory act, by means of which one places oneself
entirely within the writer’s mind and from there resolves all that is strange and alien about the text.”).
501. Id. at 293–94.
502. Id. at 295.
503. Id. at 295–96.
504. Id. at 296.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 297.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 301–02.
509. Id. at 305–06.
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The Fundamental Problem of Application

To approach the problem of application, it is first necessary to merge the
elements of hermeneutics and eliminate special hermeneutics. As a first
step, Gadamer combines the traditional elements of understanding,
interpretation, and application into a single process which he sees less as a
method and more of a “particular finesse of the mind.”510 This
combination is suitable because interpretation is simply an explicit form of
understanding which, in turn, is simply the application of the material being
interpreted to an interpreter’s prejudices.511 As a second step, Gadamer
considers the traditional delimitation of literary or philological
hermeneutics, which was established as a methodology of research in the
humanities by contrast to legal hermeneutics and theological
hermeneutics.512 The delimitation of hermeneutics by purpose as
cognitive, normative, and reproductive interpretation created difficulties of
categorization of particular interpretations in areas such as theology and law
which involve both cognitive and normative functions.513 For legal
hermeneutics, the discovery of the meaning of a text and its application is a
unitary process.514 Furthermore, since the process involved in translating
legal texts, imitating texts or reading them out loud are all the same as the
process for philological hermeneutics,515 it would be appropriate to follow
the approach of legal or theological hermeneutics as the general case for
philological hermeneutics.516
The circumstances of legal and theological hermeneutics involve breaking
the distinction between dogmatic and historical interest.517 For a jurist,
original meaning or historical knowledge of the law is helpful only for
determining the content of the law; however, a jurist must not be
constrained by legislative history, but must account for the modern
circumstances that would fulfill the underlying normative purpose of the
legislation.518 For a historian, the knowledge of the law is likewise gained
by looking at history’s continuity with the present and the preservation of

510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 308–09.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 323.
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the tradition of a legal idea;519 hence, legal hermeneutics acts to restore the
unity of hermeneutics.520 For theological hermeneutics, interpretations of
the Bible will be different depending on the prejudices of the interpreters,
which would also be based in religion: for example, the interpretation of the
old testament would be different depending on whether the interpreter is a
Christian, Jew, or Marxist.521
Therefore, historically-effected
consciousness that is involved when a judge supplements the meaning of
the original text of the law for contemporary circumstances is at play in all
hermeneutics.522 In law, it is more evident that it is impossible to simply
apply the law based on the original intention of the legislature and subsume
the concrete case of an individual entirely under a universal principle.523
Ironically, the gap between the law and the particular case will always exist
even when there are no apparent historical or social changes between a
particular case and the passage of a law.524
Gadamer references Hegel for the concept of experience and historically
affected consciousness.525
The concept of historically affected
consciousness relates to Hegel’s lord-bondsman dialectic through which
self-consciousness recognizes and is recognized by another selfconsciousness.526 Likewise, experience is what consciousness has with
itself and when it recognizes within itself what is foreign to itself.527
Drawing a parallel to Hegel’s explanation of the self-consciousness
recognizing itself and another self-consciousness, Gadamer conceptualizes
hermeneutics as a tradition which teaches us knowledge in the form of
language and which expresses itself like a “Thou.”528 This Thou is not an
object, since it relates itself to us and it not simply an opinion of another
person.529 Rather, the textual meaning is separated from the person who
meant it and “tradition is a genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it,
519. Id.
520. Id. at 325.
521. Id. at 327–28.
522. Id. at 336.
523. Id. at 518.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 338.
526. See id. at 341 (describing “historically affected consciousness” in terms of one mind
recognizing itself in another mind); Part VIII.c.ii (discussing Hegel’s lord-bondsman dialectic).
527. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 348–49; see supra Part V (discussing the consciousness’s
shedding of alien material to recognize itself relates to the consciousness recognizing its own existence
in Hegel’s lord-bondsman dialectic).
528. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 352.
529. Id.
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as does the I with a Thou.”530 The Thou experience is a special relationship
with us as human nature, another person, and a form of self-relatedness.531
Historical consciousness is parallel to this Thou, since in the otherness of
the past there is a personal transcendence awareness of the other as an
experience, instead of as an attempt to master or dominate the past.532 An
interpreter, treating the text as a Thou, experiences an openness allowing
the Thou to convey a message that creates a human bond; such openness
permits voluntary acceptance of things that are contrary to the interpreter’s
views.533
Once the text is personified as a Thou, the interpreter must question the
text in such a way that the text is reanimated into a living conversation with
the interpreter through a process of question and answer.534 Through the
process of question and answer appears the logos, which transcends the
subjective opinions of the interpreter and the text.535 In approaching a text,
the interpreter receives a question from the text and to understand the text,
the interpreter must understand the question.536 The nature of this
question is set by the horizon of the question which is also the hermeneutic
horizon.537 A question beyond the horizon goes outside what was written
in the text, but for each question within the horizon there are multiple
answers; hence, the meaning exceeds the initial text which brought forth the
question.538 The horizon is a fusion of the contemporary and historical
horizons because a reconstructed historical horizon cannot provide a
comprehensive and relevant question; it can only occur when the question
is open and beyond the author’s own knowledge or consideration.539
“Making the text speak” is not arbitrarily driven by the interpreter, but is
rather related to the answer anticipated within the text.540 This fusion of
horizons, which drives comprehension, is the understanding which occurs
530. Id.; cf. supra text in this Article accompanying notes 255–262 and Part V generally
(discussing the communal and individual nature of Geist).
531. Id. at 352–53. Here, Gadamer appears to move Hegel’s conception of the “work” which
was a part of Hegel’s Geist as reason into the category of self-consciousness through the lord-bondsman
dialectic. See supra Part V (discussing Hegel’s discussion on Geist as self-consciousness and as reason).
532. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 354.
533. Id. at 355.
534. Id. at 362.
535. Id. at 361.
536. Id. at 363.
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 367.
540. Id. at 370.
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only through the idea coming into language which is an achievement of
language in itself.541
Hermeneutics is a verbal experience,542 with words and history received
in the present from the past.543 Therefore, hermeneutics is a method of
listening in a way that the interpreter keeps the text at a distance.544 The
interpreter must quickly abandon assumptions and prejudices when they are
contradicted by a sense of the text in the same manner as happens intuitively
with oral dialogue.545 This process of continuous expectations of total
meaning, which are constantly abandoned and revised, permit the meaning
of the text to emerge.546 This movement involves arguments of opposition
so that the word which interpretively fits the text expresses the whole
meaning in a finite way.547 Although the involvement of the interpreter’s
own knowledge and existence shows the limits of methodology, this limit
does not impede hermeneutics as a science or its ability to present truth.548
IX. HERMENEUTICS FOR LEGAL RESEARCH AND INTERPRETATION
As exemplified in Duguid, the current approach to hermeneutics for legal
interpretation continues to rely predominantly on the thinking traced back
to Schleiermacher and Betti.549 In contrast, there is often no coherently
stated method of research at all for legal research.550 The perceived
advantage of using the methods employed by Schleiermacher and further
advocated for by Betti is the appearance of a scientific detachment by the
interpreter of the autonomous text.551 Thereby, the interpreter provides an
appearance of being “scientific” through an illusion of removing himself
from the text and sanitizing his analysis of a text to be simply retelling what
is written.

541. Id. at 370–71.
542. Id. at 440.
543. Id. at 459.
544. Id. at 461.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 484.
549. Duguid exemplifies the legal reasoning of these two authors. See generally Facebook, Inc. v.
Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021) (providing an example of the modern use of the reasonings of
Schleiermacher and Betti).
550. Rubin, supra note 3, at 1835.
551. See Vertsman, supra note 6 (demonstrating contrary legal opinions and their results
through various judicial strategies applied to law interpretation).
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Phenomenologically, this attempt, at only reading what is written without
adding anything new, inevitably fails, as seen empirically through nonunanimous judicial decisions, involving learned judges and scholars who
read the same text and come to contradictory understandings regarding its
content.552 This contradiction between the proposed objective unitary
meaning of a text and the failure of jurists and scholars to agree upon that
meaning may give rise to an appearance of political bias or impropriety, or,
even worse, an appearance that a computer may make for a better jurist than
a human.553 Ultimately, this attempt at objectivity can never be successful
because it focuses on the mechanics of language while ignoring the
underlying essence of language involving common shared meaning between
socially connected individuals.
Gadamer provided a phenomenological description of how texts are
being interpreted and simplified some of Hegelian’s ideas in metaphysics.
Additionally, Gadamer provided an elegant solution to the problem of each
textual interpretation being comprised of multiple interpretations, moving
through the steps of visually recognizing the text, reading the text, then
understanding the performed text. Through the concepts of play, image,
and memory, Gadamer helped resolve the apparent problem that each
reading was in effect a derivative work, and that the derivative work’s
relationship to the recorded text would be too attenuated for the
interpretation to provide meaning. Because each reading is in effect a
performance, the reading serves as a reflection of the original text, and the
comprehension of the reading is as linked to the text as an image in the
mirror is linked to what is being reflected: the object and the reflection do
not exist apart from each other.
Gadamer’s approach to a text acting as another person or a Thou
provided for a simplification of Hegel’s approach. Hegel’s approach placed
a work as a part of Geist as reason, beyond the individual and as an
intermediate point between the Geist as an individual, aware of other
individuals, and the Geist as a commonwealth. Gadamer’s approach,
nonetheless, brought the Thou of the text back into the community
understanding through the use of language as a part of the shared human
experience. In summary, Gadamer relied heavily on Hegel while working
552. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. at 1174 (Alito, J., concurring) (considering it may be possible in the
future to understand text by relying on an analysis of language use obtained from a vast database); see
cases cited supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text (recognizing issues with the use of the canons of
construction).
553. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. at 1174.
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to eliminate some of the religious overtones, which may have also
deemphasized some of the communal nature of understanding. However,
it is this specific communal nature of understanding from shared language
and Geist that is crucial when approaching text in a cross-cultural or a global
environment. The discussion between the text and the interpreter must take
an explicitly open form so that the “reason” or “logos” of the text can be
exposed and it can be understood in terms of its cultural artifacts and the
Bildung within both the local and the world culture. This approach allows
for greater meaning and understanding among cultures lacking a shared
language or background and allows for significantly different cultures to
draw reciprocal inspiration from each other’s texts.
A core question remains: How does one actually implement Gadamer’s
and Hegel’s theories to research or resolve legal cases?554 First, for terms
or sections of text that are not contentious or difficult, one can understand
those sections intuitively without formally reflecting on the process of
understanding. However, the parts of the text that are not contentious and
not difficult depend entirely on the level of commonality between the
contemporary audience and the interpreter (the contemporary author).
Therefore, the threshold for explicit hermeneutical analysis is comparatively
lower in international context and in situations where there is a greater
temporal distance between the interpreter and the origin of a text. For
contentious or difficult parts of the text, the focus should be on an imaginary
dialogue to make explicit the meaning from the intersection of the I and the
Thou (the text) and the communal values that may or may not be shared by
either the I or the Thou. In this way, the relevant text or work is not the
one intended by the original author for the original audience, but rather the
work which has been acquired by the interpreter who is surrounded by his
own contemporary culture. Therefore, the role of Schleiermacher’s
grammatical and psychological interpretation should be reduced to cases of
very simple misunderstandings by the interpreter. This limitation would not
require an explicit imaginary dialogue, but rather a simple notice in order to
make a mechanical correction of a mistake an interpreter would easily realize
and rarely challenge.
After engaging in an “imaginary dialogue” as a hermeneutic activity, one
would in turn need to engage in a productive activity of documenting the
interpretation as an artifact to be used by others. To document the
554. See Vertsman, supra note 6 for a consolidated paradigm and alternate view on different
standards of deference or scrutiny applied in judicial review).
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imaginary dialogue, there should be an explicit section in the interpretation
that makes explicit the prejudices or pre-conceptions of the interpreter
being used as a part of the interpretation. This should be an explicit section
in the vein of “discussion” or “analysis” in order to permit the readers to
not only compare those prejudices to their own prejudices, but to also make
predictions on how future analogous cases may be decided. Admittedly,
people are not aware of all their relevant prejudices and few people would
be capable or willing to express those prejudices for public evaluation or
criticism. Notwithstanding this reality, many of these prejudices would be
exposed during the hermeneutic or “imaginary” dialogue; even a limited
discussion of some of the more crucial prejudices can provide for more
predictable judicial judgments and can provide a clearer view for academic
legal research, especially when certain perspectives have been omitted or
overrepresented in scholarship. Furthermore, even for those who do not
share the same prejudices, the discussion of prejudices should provide for a
closer tailoring between the conclusion of an opinion or research and the
justification upon which the conclusion is founded. This would reduce the
perception of bias or ulterior motives, provide the community with an
opportunity to evaluate whether decision makers share the same community
values, and expose ideological or cultural fault lines.
The imaginary dialogue should partially replace the current approach of
looking to legislative history or to canons of statutory construction. Such
an imaginary dialogue should take the form of a Socratic question and
answer posed to the text to create a disequilibrium followed by a
reconstruction of new knowledge.555 This would follow the education or
Bildung which we observe in law school discussions or lectures.556 In a
manner analogous to a student being questioned by a professor serving as a
model for all the students in the class, the judge or scholar would act as a
proxy for the reader or society as a whole in questioning the text and
anticipating the answers based on the common perception of communal
values, grammar of the text, as well as elements relating to the text’s creation.
In this imaginary dialogue, the questions and answers reveal the biases of
the judge or scholar as well as provide for an explicit critique of the
underlying text. This process also ameliorates institutionalized unfairness
since it would be an absurdity for the text to argue for a blatantly unfair
555. Deborah L. Borman & Catherine Haras, Something Borrowed: Interdisciplinary Strategies for Legal
Education, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 357, 382 (2019).
556. See generally George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 162 (1973) (detailing legal training in the United States since 1870).
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result. Such arguments would be absurd because they imply a malevolent
legislature and, furthermore, that the interpreter may be willing to achieve
malevolent ends. In effect, this potential absurdity is in itself a constraint
on interpretation as it would be a blatant misinterpretation to regard the law
giver as irrational or as seeking injury to the public.
Finally, the phenomenologically more accurate approach to
hermeneutics, which involves both the text and the interpreter, provides for
a more cohesive methodology for both normative and philological
interpretation. Exploring a text with extraneous information about its
author, the intended audience, and the grammar within the text allows for
an appearance of objectivity and attempts to minimize the role of the
interpreter; however, in reducing a text to an object, we also reduce humans
to simply existing as imperfect machines that mechanically apply aphorisms.
Beyond providing a despondent appraisal of the human condition, this
approach to textual interpretation is conceptually incorrect.
The
idiosyncratic elements of the present culture and the interpreter are
incorporated within every interpretation along with the idiosyncratic
elements of the past and of the original author. In appreciating these
elements, we obtain richer understanding, and by making our prejudices
explicit, we elevate hermeneutics to its proper position as a method and as
a science.
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